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Abstract
Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with
consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves
screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost in-
formation threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding’s after-markets enable consumers to
actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular
crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through con-
ditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed
an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing
demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional
entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard.
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Crowdfunding has attracted much attention in recent years as a new mode of financing
entrepreneurs: through the internet, many individuals – the crowd – provide funds di-
rectly to the entrepreneur rather than through a financial intermediary to whom the task
to oversee the investment is delegated.1 Given the typical agency problems associated
with entrepreneurial financing, the popularity of crowdfunding is surprising.2 In partic-
ular, Diamond’s (1984) seminal paper suggests that crowdfunding cannot handle agency
problems well because, due to the large number of investors, the free-riding problem and
duplication costs in monitoring are especially severe.
However, popular crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter and Indiegogo not only
dispense with the financial intermediary, they also change the returns to investment.
Instead of promising a monetary return, they promise investors only the good which the
entrepreneur intends to develop. Hence, with these so-called reward-based crowdfunding
schemes the entrepreneur’s consumers become her investors. Therefore, a crowdfunding
platform, next to eliminating the financial intermediary, provides innovation in that it
allows an entrepreneur to contract with her future consumers before investments are sunk.
The objective of this paper is to show that this latter innovation has an important
efficiency effect that persists despite the presence of moral hazard and private cost infor-
mation. The basic intuition behind the efficiency gain is straightforward.3 By directly
addressing consumers, the contract can elicit their demand and, thereby, obtain informa-
tion about whether aggregate demand is large enough to cover the project’s investment
costs. Hence, by conditioning the investment decision on this information, crowdfunding
has the potential to yield more efficient investment decisions.
In the presence of entrepreneurial moral hazard, it is, however, not clear whether the
contracting parties can actually realize this potential efficiency gain. Due to private infor-
mation, consumers have to be given incentives to honestly reveal their demand and, due
to moral hazard, the entrepreneur has to be given incentives to properly invest. Private
information about investment and production costs leads to additional complications.
All these incentive problems may thwart the efficiency effect of crowdfunding to reduce
demand uncertainty.
This leads us to our central research question. Defining crowdfunding covenants as
contracts between an entrepreneur and her consumers before the project’s investment, we
1Mollick (2014) explicitly defines crowdfunding as ventures “without standard financial intermedi-
aries.”
2The Economist (2012) reports: “talk of crowdfunding as a short-lived fad has largely ceased.” Reg-
ulatory reforms such as SEC (2015) indicate that also regulators expect crowdfunding to persist.
3Agrawal et al. (2014) and Belleflamme et al. (2015) discuss this effect informally, while Chang (2015),
Chemla and Tinn (2016), Ellman and Hurkens (2015), Gruener and Siemroth (2015), Schwienbacher
(2015), and this paper model it explicitly.
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investigate the potential of such contracts to implement efficient and profit-maximizing
allocations. In particular, we characterize (constrained) efficient outcomes in the presence
of entrepreneurial moral hazard, consumers’ private information about demand, and the
entrepreneur’s private information about her cost structure. We moreover argue that
popular crowdfunding schemes reflect their properties.
By modeling entrepreneurial moral hazard as the entrepreneur’s ability to embezzle
investment funds, we obtain our first two insights. First, deferred payments are the
primary tool to control moral hazard. Second, the entrepreneur should be given as little
as possible information on the size of these deferred payments. Intuitively, moral hazard
is prevented if the entrepreneur expects the deferred payments for completing the project
to exceed her payoff from embezzling funds, and providing information about their size
makes it harder to control the entrepreneur’s embezzlement.
Because the deferred payments contain the rents for the entrepreneur that are nec-
essary to guarantee incentive-compatibility, they represent agency costs that augment
the project’s implementation costs. We show that they are strictly positive only in the
presence of moral hazard, while private information about the project’s cost can solely am-
plify them. This suggests the pecking order that, in crowdfunding, entrepreneurial moral
hazard is a first-order problem, whereas private cost information is of second order.4
More precisely, we show that an investment policy is consistent with the entrepreneur’s
incentives if its expected returns exceed its augmented implementation costs. We call such
investments affluent and identify such affluence as the crucial concept for both optimality
and implementability. That is, optimal contracts implement efficient outcomes if and only
if the efficient investment policy is affluent. More generally, the second-best investment
policy maximizes aggregate surplus under the restriction that it is affluent. If first-best
investment is not affluent then the second-best distorts investment decisions downwards
to ensure affluency. These downward distortions raise the level of deferred payments and
ensure that the investment policy is consistent with the entrepreneur’s incentives.
In addition to characterizing optimal mechanisms in our theoretical benchmark, we
argue that popular crowdfunding schemes indirectly implement their two main features –
they induce deferred payments and limit the entrepreneur’s information about their size.
In order to identify the critical components by which crowdfunding schemes achieve this,
we first describe the crowdfunding scheme as offered by Kickstarter, the most successful
crowdfunding platform to date.
The entrepreneur is first asked to describe the following three elements of her project
on Kickstarter’s public webpage: 1) a description of the reward to the consumer, which
is typically the entrepreneur’s final product; 2) a pledge level p; and 3) a target level
T . After describing these elements, the crowdfunding campaign starts and, for a fixed
4The amplification effect of private cost information may however be substantial.
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period of time – usually 30 days – a consumer can pledge the amount p to support the
project financially. During the campaign, Kickstarter provides accurate information on
the aggregate level of pledges so that a consumer can, in principle, condition his decision
to pledge on the contributions of previous consumers.
After the campaign ends, Kickstarter compares the target level T to the sum of pledges
P ≡ ñ · p, where ñ is the number of pledging consumers. If aggregate pledges P fall short
of the target level T , Kickstarter declares the crowdfunding campaign a failure and cancels
the project. In this case, consumers do not pay their pledges and the entrepreneur has
no obligation to invest. If aggregate pledges P exceed the target level T , Kickstarter
declares the crowdfunding campaign a success. Only in this case Kickstarter collects the
pledges from consumers and transfers them to the entrepreneur who, in return, develops
the product and delivers the rewards. In the parlance of crowdfunding, Kickstarter uses an
all-or-nothing reward-based crowdfunding scheme where the entrepreneur receives “all” if
the campaign is successful and “nothing” in case of failure.
In line with our theoretical results, the all-or-nothing target is the crucial feature by
which the scheme conditions investment on revealed demand.5 When first-best investment
is affluent then the optimal crowdfunding target corresponds to one that induces efficient
investment. If first-best investment is not affluent, then the optimal target level has to
be set inefficiently high so that underinvestment results.
Kickstarter’s scheme itself does not, however, use deferred payments; as stated in its
guidelines, Kickstarter transfers all pledges to the entrepreneur directly after the cam-
paign. Yet, because entrepreneurs, following a successful crowdfunding campaign, sell
their good also to non-crowdfunding consumers in an after-market, the overall crowd-
funding mechanism should be viewed as a combination of the platform’s scheme together
with this after-market.
This combination allows an implicit but natural implementation of deferred payments
as follows. Consumers who value the good start pledging, but as soon as they observe
that the target has been reached, they stop and wait to buy the product in the after-
market instead. Hence, in practice the deferred payments that are crucial for controlling
moral hazard come from the consumers in the after-market. In addition, the consumers’
conditional pledging behavior ensures that the entrepreneur learns only that demand is
high enough to make the project profitable, but not by how much. Our formal results
show that, in the presence of entrepreneurial moral hazard, this reflects an optimal degree
5All-or-nothing schemes are commonly used by platforms that focus on for-profit projects (e.g., Kick-
starter, Sellaband, and PledgeMusic). Platforms that focus on non-profit projects (e.g., GoFundMe) often
use the alternative “keep-what-you-raise” system, where pledges are triggered even if the target level is
not reached. Indiegogo, which describes itself as both a for-profit and non-profit platform, actually gives




A crucial feature of the Kickstarter scheme is, therefore, that the level of aggregate
contributions is accurately reported while the campaign is active. Only this allows con-
sumers to use a conditional pledging strategy by which they can actively mitigate threats
of moral hazard. The conditional pledging behavior is also consistent with the empirical
evidence on crowdfunding. For instance, Mollick (2014, p. 6) observes that “projects that
succeed tend to do so by relatively small margins.” Moreover, more specialized crowd-
funding platforms such as PledgeMusic, whose after-markets are arguably small, explicitly
use deferred payments.7
Finally, we note that as crowdfunding schemes themselves are, in the presence of
moral hazard, unable to attain full efficiency in general, they complement rather than
substitute traditional forms of venture capital – the strength of crowdfunding lies in
learning about demand, whereas the advantage of venture capitalists (or banks) lies in
controlling entrepreneurial moral hazard. Although we do not model it explicitly, we point
out that this complementarity suggests a sequential financing strategy for entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneur first approaches a venture capitalist (VC). The VC invests only if he is
convinced that demand for the product is high. If not, the VC turns down the project
and the entrepreneur starts a crowdfunding campaign with a target that, due to the large
moral hazard problems associated with crowdfunding, has to be set at an inefficiently
high level. After a successful campaign, the entrepreneur finances her project through
crowdfunding. If, however, the crowdfunding campaign falls short of its target by a
relatively small amount then this reveals that, in principle, demand is high enough to
make the project profitable, but not high enough to also cover the high agency costs
associated with crowdfunding. Given that the VC has better means to control moral
hazard and, therefore, has smaller agency costs, the entrepreneur may then return to the
VC to obtain funds. Indeed, Kickstarter reports that “78% of projects that raised more
than 20% of their goal were successfully funded.”8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the setup and takes an intuitive approach that identifies
the main trade-offs. Section 4 sets up the problem as one of mechanism design and
characterizes (constrained) efficient mechanisms. Section 5 relates optimal mechanisms
to real-life crowdfunding mechanisms and examines extensions. Section 6 concludes. All
formal proofs are collected in the appendix.
6If efficient investment is affluent and marginal costs are zero, then a dynamic scheme with the efficient
target actually simultaneously handles optimal deferral of payments and optimal information limitation.
If efficient investment satisfies a slightly stricter affluency condition (i.e., the right hand side of (44) is to
be divided by 1− c), then it also does so for strictly positive marginal costs (c > 0).
7As we argue in the extensions, deferred payments are also obtained from consumers, who for some
exogenous reason cannot participate in crowdfunding but can acquire the product only in the after-market.
8See https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016.
5
2 Related literature
Being a relatively new phenomenon, the economic literature on crowdfunding is small
but growing. Agrawal et al. (2014) and Belleflamme et al. (2015) discuss crowdfunding’s
economic underpinnings. Potential benefits stem from reducing demand uncertainty and
using crowdfunding as a tool for price discrimination, whereas dealing with entrepreneurial
moral hazard and informational asymmetries present crowdfunding’s main challenges.
Subsequent theoretical literature has studied these issues in closer detail by modeling
them formally. In contrast to the current paper, most of this literature does not take a
full-fledged mechanism design approach, but compares specific crowdfunding schemes as
used in practice.9
Most closely related is Chemla and Tinn (2016), who likewise focus on the problem
of entrepreneurial moral hazard. While these authors also analyze a model of demand
uncertainty with binary consumer valuations, the analysis differs in two respects. First,
rather than taking a general mechanism design approach, the authors compare two specific
reward-based crowdfunding mechanisms: take-it-all vs. all-or-nothing schemes. Second,
they assume that if consumers are indifferent between the option to crowdfund and the
option to wait for the after market, they crowdfund with probability 1. At first sight, this
deterministic tie-breaking rule seems innocuous, but its assumption effectively deprives
consumers of an important tool for controlling moral hazard: conditional pledging. More
precisely, our insight that the dynamic schemes which crowdfunding platforms use in
practice allow consumers to use conditional pledging strategies can, in a static framework,
not be represent by a deterministic tie-breaking rule. As a result, the tie-breaking rule
affects economic results significantly. In particular, the conclusion in Chemla and Tinn
(2016) that the share of consumers who have access to the campaign must be sufficiently
low to prevent moral hazard does not hold with more general tie-breaking rules.
Similarly to Chemla and Tinn (2016), Chang (2015) also compares take-it-all and all-
or-nothing reward-based crowdfunding schemes, but in a pure public good setup in which
consumers have an identical but initially unknown valuation for the good. In line with
Chemla and Tinn (2016), he shows that these crowdfunding schemes withstand moral
hazard provided that only a small enough measure of consumers can acquire the good
through crowdfunding.
Abstracting from moral hazard, Ellman and Hurkens (2015) study the benefits of
crowdfunding as a tool for both price discrimination and for reducing demand uncertainty
(market testing). They point out that the usual practice of crowdfunding to condition a
campaign’s success on the sum of pledges is generally suboptimal. This is in line with
9Most papers also model the entrepreneur as the principal, who offers a profit-maximizing crowd-
funding scheme to consumers. This approach cannot handle well private cost information, because such
private information renders the model in a signaling game (or informed principal problem).
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earlier results of Cornelli (1996), who shows that profit-maximizing mechanisms condition
the investment decision on the composition of aggregate contributions rather than the sum
of aggregate contributions. While Cornelli (1996) obtains this result with a continuum
of consumer types, Ellman and Hurkens (2015) refine this result by considering discrete
types. Using mechanism design, they show that conditioning investment on the sum of
pledges is generally only optimal with two types.
These results suggest that popular crowdfunding platforms provide entrepreneurs only
with suboptimal tools for price discrimination and that their main efficiency effect lies in
the reduction of demand uncertainty.10 Gruener and Siemroth (2015) study this effect of
crowdfunding with correlated signals and in the presence of wealth constraints. Hakenes
and Schlegel (2015) investigate the incentives of potential consumers to actively acquire
private information, which a firm subsequently elicits through a crowdfunding scheme.
Apart from the recent literature on crowdfunding, there is surprisingly little work in
economics and finance that focuses on the firm’s ability to learn about the value of its
projects by addressing consumers directly. In contrast, the marketing literature explic-
itly addresses this issue in its subfield of market research, focusing on consumer surveys
and product testing (e.g., Lauga and Ofek, 2009). Ding (2007), however, points out that
market research mainly relies on voluntary, non-incentivized reporting by consumers. He
emphasizes that consumers need to be given explicit incentives for revealing their informa-
tion truthfully. In line with this view, we point out that crowdfunding schemes naturally
provide explicit incentives for such truthtelling.
While most empirical crowdfunding studies aim at identifying the crucial features
of successful crowdfunding campaigns, two studies explicitly address moral hazard. In
particular, Mollick (2014) finds little evidence of fraud in reward-crowdfunding, indicating
that, consistent with our results, this type of crowdfunding is able to handle potential
moral hazard problems. In contrast, Hildebrand et al. (2016) identify an increased problem
of moral hazard for investment-based crowdfunding. Moreover, Mollick and Kuppuswamy
(2014) report in a survey of crowdfunding projects that “To see if there was demand for
the project” was the most agreed-upon reason for entrepreneurs to use crowdfunding.
Viotto da Cruz (2016) provides empirical support for the idea that entrepreneurs use
reward-based crowdfunding to learn about market demand.
10Although suboptimal, popular schemes nevertheless enable firms to price-discriminate consumers to
some degree. For example, Belleflamme et. al (2014) argue that crowdfunding allows a discrimination
between consumers who obtain an additional benefit from participating in crowdfunding and those who
do not.
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3 A model of crowdfunding
In this section, we introduce the framework and develop some preliminary insights. The
framework considers an entrepreneur who, prior to her investment decision, directly inter-
acts with privately informed consumers about whether they value the product. In order
to clearly demonstrate the potential of crowdfunding, we first model and discuss the role
of demand uncertainty and, only in a second step, introduce entrepreneurial moral hazard
and private information regarding the cost structure.
The entrepreneur. We consider a penniless entrepreneur who needs an upfront invest-
ment of I > 0 to develop her product. After developing it, the entrepreneur can produce
the good at some marginal cost c ∈ [0, 1). The entrepreneur is crucial for realizing the
project and cannot sell her idea to outsiders. We normalize interest rates to zero and
abstract from any uncertainty concerning the development of the product.
The crowd. We consider a total of n consumers and denote a specific consumer by the
index i ∈ N ≡ {1, . . . , n}. A consumer i either values the good, vi = 1, or not, vi = 0.
11
Hence, the n-dimensional vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V ≡ {0, 1}
n represents the valuation
profile of the consumers. We let π(v) denote its corresponding probability. As a result,







Since the marginal costs c are smaller than 1, we can take ñ as the potential demand of
the entrepreneur’s good. Its randomness expresses the demand uncertainty.
Investing without demand uncertainty. Consider as a benchmark the case of perfect
information, where the realized demand ñ is observable so that the investment decision
can directly condition on it. It is socially optimal that the entrepreneur invests if the
project’s revenue, ñ, covers the costs of production I + ñc, i.e., if










We assume that S∗ is strictly positive. Note that by investing for ñ > n∗ and subsequently
selling the good at a price p = 1, the entrepreneur can appropriate the full surplus. Given
11The binary structure ensures that demand uncertainty expresses itself only concerning the question
of whether the entrepreneur should invest without affecting actual pricing decisions. It clarifies that the
model’s driving force is not price discrimination. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.
12Let ⌈x⌉ denote the smallest integer larger than x.
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that the entrepreneur obtains the funds, this behavior represents her optimal strategy.
Anticipating the entrepreneur’s optimal behavior, a competitive credit market is willing
to lend the amount I at the normalized interest rate of zero. Unsurprisingly, perfect
information combined with a competitive credit market yield an efficient outcome.
Investing with demand uncertainty. Next, consider the setup with demand uncer-
tainty, i.e., the entrepreneur must decide to invest I without knowing ñ. If she does invest,









It is therefore profitable to invest only if Π̄ ≥ 0. Even though the price p = 1 does not
leave any consumer rents, the entrepreneur’s decision to invest leads either to under- or
overinvestment. For parameter constellations such that Π̄ < 0, the entrepreneur will not
invest and, hence, underinvestment results (because the good is not produced for any
ñ > n∗, where it would be efficient to produce). For the parameter constellation Π̄ ≥ 0,
the entrepreneur does invest I, but this implies overinvestment (because she produces the
good even when it turns out that ñ < n∗).
Crowdfunding without moral hazard. We next consider the case of demand un-
certainty but with an “all-or-nothing, reward-based crowdfunding scheme” (p, T ) as in-
troduced in the introduction. That is, the investment is now governed by a contract
pair (p, T ) with the interpretation that if n̂ consumers pledge so that the total amount of
pledges, P = n̂p, exceeds T , then the entrepreneur obtains it “all”: she receives the pledges
P , invests, and produces a good for each consumer who pledged. If the total amount of
pledges P falls short of T then the entrepreneur obtains “nothing”: the pledges are not
triggered, the entrepreneur does not receive any funding, and she does not invest.
It is straightforward to see that this crowdfunding scheme enables the entrepreneur
to extract the maximum aggregate surplus S∗ and thereby achieve an efficient outcome.
Indeed, for any p ∈ (0, 1], it is optimal for the consumer to pledge p if and only if v = 1.
As a result, exactly ñ consumers sign up so that the sum of pledges equals P = ñp.
Hence, the project is triggered if and only if T ≤ ñp. It follows that an all-or-nothing
crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) with p ∈ (0, 1] yields the entrepreneur the expected profit





Clearly, a pledge level p = 1 and target level T = n∗ maximize profits, enabling the
entrepreneur to extract the surplus S∗, and yield an efficient outcome.
Apart from stressing the surprisingly simple way in which the crowdfunding pair (p, T )
resolves the problem of demand uncertainty, it is worthwhile to point out three additional
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features. First, for any possible outcome of the crowdfunding scheme, the consumers
and entrepreneurs obtain at least their outside option from non-participation. Hence,
there is no regret over participation after a consumer learns whether the campaign has
been a success or a failure. Second, despite the presence of a crowd, the crowdfunding
scheme circumvents any potential coordination problems. This is because of the scheme’s
third feature: it eliminates any problems with strategic uncertainty concerning both the
behavior and the private information of other consumers. In other words, the all-or-
nothing crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) = (1, n∗) respects ex post participation constraints
and implements the first best in dominant strategies.
Moral hazard. The setup until now abstracted from problems of moral hazard; con-
sumers are guaranteed the promised good if their pledge is triggered. In practice, con-
sumers may, however, be concerned about whether the entrepreneur will deliver a good
that meets the initial specifications – or even deliver the good at all.
We capture the problem of moral hazard by assuming that after the entrepreneur
has obtained the money from the crowdfunding platform, she can “make a run for it”
and thereby keep a share α ∈ [0, 1]. When the entrepreneur “runs” she does not incur
any investment or production costs and consumers do not obtain their goods. The share
(1−α) is lost and represents a cost for running off with the money. Hence, the parameter
α measures the weakness of the institutional environment to prevent moral hazard. For
the extreme α = 0, there is effectively no moral hazard, whereas for the extreme α = 1,
the entrepreneur can keep all the pledges without incurring any costs.
It is important to stress that this modeling approach captures several types of moral
hazard problems. First, we can take the running literally: The entrepreneur is able to flee
with the money and thereby keep a share αP without being caught. Or, alternatively,
run off with the amount P but with an expected fine of (1−α)P .13 Second, at a reduced
cost of (1 − α)P < I − ñc the entrepreneur can provide the consumer with a product
that matches the formal description but is still worthless to the consumer.14 Third, by
a (possibly expected) cost (1 − α)P , the entrepreneur can convincingly claim that the
project failed so that, without fear of any legal repercussions, she does not need to deliver
13For example, the project “Code hero” raised ✩170,954 but never delivered any rewards, Poly-
gon.com states “His critics believe he has run off with the money raised from the Kickstarter cam-
paign” (https://www.polygon.com/2012/12/18/3781782/code-hero-kickstarter-interview , last
retrieved Sep. 10, 2016), whereas the campaign “Asylum Playing Cards” resulted in legal fines “against
a crowdfunded project that didn’t follow through on its promise to backers” (http://www.atg.wa.
gov/news/news-releases/ag-makes-crowdfunded-company-pay-shady-deal , last retrieved Sep. 10,
2016).
14For example, the crowdfunding project “Healbe GoBe” caused much controversy about whether the
delivered product actually worked (see http://blog.belgoat.com/24-hours-with-my-healbe-gobe/,
last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016).
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the product and she can keep the pledges.15
In order to see that moral hazard undermines the simple crowdfunding scheme, note
that, facing aggregated pledges P , the entrepreneur obtains a payoff αP from running
and a profit P − I − cP/p from investing. Hence, she runs if
αP > P − I − cP/p. (1)
The inequality not only holds for the extreme α = 1 but also for any α ≥ 1− c/p. For all
these cases, consumers anticipate that the entrepreneur will not deliver the product and
so are not willing to participate in the crowdfunding scheme.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce two intuitive but ad hoc changes to the
crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) that reduce entrepreneurial moral hazard. Using a mechanism
design approach, the next section proves that the two changes lead to mechanisms that
are indeed optimal in the class of all possible mechanisms; even if we also consider that
the entrepreneur is privately informed about her investment and production costs.
Deferred payments. An intuitive way to mitigate the moral hazard problem is to
transfer the consumers’ pledges to the entrepreneur only after having produced the good.
Since the penniless entrepreneur needs at least the amount I to develop the product, such
a delay in payments is possible only up to the amount I.
Hence, a first, ad hoc step toward mitigating the moral hazard problem is to adjust
the crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) and introduce deferred payments as follows. As before,
the variable p represents the pledge level of an individual consumer and T the target level
which the sum of pledges, P , has to meet before the investment is triggered. In contrast to
our previous interpretation, however, the entrepreneur, after learning P , initially obtains
only the required amount I for investing in the development of the product and receives
the remaining sum P − I only after having developed the product.
In order to characterize crowdfunding schemes with deferred payments that prevent
moral hazard, note that the entrepreneur now obtains only the payoff αI from a run and
the payoff P − I − cP/p from realizing the project. With a pledge level p = 1, she has no
incentive to run if
αI ≤ P − I − cP ⇒ P ≥ P̄ ≡
(1 + α)I
1− c
= (1 + α)n∗. (2)
In particular, the deferred crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) = (1, P̄ ) leads to an equilibrium
outcome in which the entrepreneur never runs. Using this scheme, the project is triggered
15For example, Kickstarter explicitly refers to this possibility: “If a creator is making a good
faith effort to complete their project and is transparent about it, backers should do their best to
be patient and understanding while demanding continued accountability from the creator.” (https:
//www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics#Acco, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016).
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when at least T = P̄ consumers pledge so that it induces the entrepreneur to diligently
complete the project.
Even though crowdfunding schemes with a deferred payment enable a prevention of
moral hazard, they only do so with an inefficiently high target level T . That is because
by taking the money and running, the entrepreneur can ensure a rent of at least αI. To
induce the entrepreneur not to run, the project must therefore yield her a surplus of at
least αI. Yet, by definition, the efficient threshold n∗ is such that when completing the
project diligently, the project yields a surplus of exactly zero. Raising the target level
from n∗ to (1 + α)n∗ ensures that the entrepreneur obtains a rent if the target level is
triggered. Nonetheless, an inefficiently high target level implies that the scheme exhibits
underinvestment.
The information trade-off. We showed that a crowdfunding scheme with deferred
payments can circumvent the moral hazard problem while still revealing the aggregate
demand from consumers. Since this deferred crowdfunding scheme does not yield an
efficient outcome, the question arises as to whether we can reduce the inefficiency with
more sophisticated schemes.
We next argue that by limiting the information which the entrepreneur learns about
demand, this is indeed possible. Given the argument that the fundamental benefit of
crowdfunding is to reduce the entrepreneur’s uncertainty about consumer demand, this
may sound somewhat paradoxical. Note, however, that with respect to implementing the
efficient investment decision, the entrepreneur only needs to learn whether ñ is above or
below n∗. That is, the exact value of ñ is not important.
In contrast, providing the entrepreneur with full information about ñ intensifies moral
hazard because, with full information, a prevention of moral hazard requires inequality
(2) to hold for any possible realization of P ≥ T . In particular, it has to hold for the most
stringent case P = T . As a result, a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) with p = 1 prevents
moral hazard if and only if the target T exceeds the threshold P̄ .
However, if the entrepreneur learned only that P exceeds T rather than the exact
value of P itself, then, with the pledge level p = 1, she would rationally anticipate an
expected payoff E[P |P ≥ T ]−I−cE[P |P ≥ T ] from not running. Hence, a crowdfunding
scheme that reveals only whether P exceeds T prevents moral hazard if
E[P |P ≥ T ] ≥ P̄ . (3)
Since the conditional expectation E[P |P ≥ T ] is at least T , condition (3) is weaker than
condition (2). This implies that a partially informative crowdfunding scheme deals with
moral hazard more effectively. In other words, it withstands moral hazard with a target
level T below P̄ . Reducing the informativeness of the crowdfunding scheme therefore
allows us to reduce inefficiencies.
12
This shows that the extraction of demand information interacts with the moral hazard
problem and, in the presence of both demand uncertainty and moral hazard, the informa-
tion extraction problem is sophisticated; the entrepreneur should learn neither too much
nor too little.
The after-market. With the help of deferred payments, we first solved the moral hazard
problem in crowdfunding and, subsequently, improved the scheme’s efficiency by reduc-
ing the entrepreneur’s information concerning these deferred payments. The resulting
crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) is an information-restricted, payout-deferred, all-or-nothing
reward-based crowdfunding scheme.
At first sight, this hypothetical scheme seems to contradict how crowdfunding works
in practice. Actual crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter offer a dynamic scheme
and provide accurate and up-to-date information during the campaign about cumulative
pledges. Moreover, almost all platforms hand out the collected pledges to the entrepreneur
immediately after a campaign has successfully ended. Hence, crowdfunding platforms do
not appear to use deferred payment or actively hide information about pledges from the
entrepreneur.
On closer inspection, however, the dynamic schemes that current crowdfunding plat-
forms offer and the information they provide allow an indirect implementation of deferred
payments. This is because, in practice, participation in crowdfunding is not the only
way for consumers to obtain the product. Indeed, once entrepreneurs have successfully
developed the product, they also offer them for sale to non-pledging consumers in an
“after-market.”
Together with a dynamic crowdfunding scheme, this after-market allows an indirect
implementation of the opaque deferred payments that underlie our hypothetical scheme
because it enables consumers to use a conditional pledging strategy.16 In particular,
consumers who value the product line up and start pledging p = 1 sequentially, but, as
soon as the target level is reached, pledging stops. All remaining consumers wait and
buy the good at the sequentially rational price of 1 in the after-market.17 This strategy
is optimal, implements deferred payments, and leaves the entrepreneur uninformed about
their exact size.
Hence, it is the specific dynamic structure of crowdfunding schemes in combination
with the after-market by which popular crowdfunding platforms induce opaque deferred
16Since an explicit implementation of deferred payments by the crowdfunding platform requires the
delivery of the product to be verifiable, this conditional pledging behavior also solves a potential enforce-
ability issue of deferred payments.
17This argument hinges on the idea that consumers are willing to pledge up to a level p that makes them
indifferent between pledging or buying in the after-market. Therefore, it also holds if the investment’s
success probability is commonly known to be less than one or, similarly, if there is discounting but
pledging and non-pledging consumers obtain the good at the same time.
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payments. In particular, a crucial feature of these schemes is that crowdfunding platforms
report up-to-date information about the cumulative pledge level so that consumers can
condition their decision to pledge on the current level of pledges.
This conditional pledging behavior is also consistent with the empirical observation of
Mollick (2014) that successful campaigns tend to overshoot their targets only by relatively
small margins. Moreover, specialized crowdfunding platforms such as PledgeMusic, whose
after-markets are non-existent, explicitly use deferred payments to address problems of
moral hazard.18
Private cost information. Importantly, the reward-based crowdfunding scheme as de-
rived above conditions on the entrepreneur’s investment I and her marginal cost c. The
scheme therefore implicitly assumes that the entrepreneur’s cost structure (I, c) is ob-
servable. It seems, however, natural that entrepreneurs are better informed about their
cost structure than consumers or the crowdfunding platform. Also in practice, consumers
and crowdfunding platforms reportedly worry that crowdfunding will attract fraudulent
entrepreneurs who falsely claim to be able to manufacture some highly attractive product
at some very low cost – whereas the true costs to manufacture such products are pro-
hibitively high.19 Taking this informational asymmetry seriously, an implementation of
our crowdfunding scheme would then require the entrepreneur to first truthfully report her
cost structure. The need for truthful revelation creates an additional incentive problem.
Note, however, that false reports about the cost structure are only profitable if the
entrepreneur is able to run off with the money without incurring the true cost of the
project. In other words, if there is no moral hazard (α = 0) then the entrepreneur’s private
cost information does not matter because the entrepreneur has nothing to gain from
misrepresenting her costs. More precisely, the aforementioned concerns about fraudulent
entrepreneurs is that they make false claims together with the intention to run off with
the money. The presence of moral hazard is therefore a prerequisite for private cost
information to cause problems. In other words, entrepreneurial moral hazard is a first-
order problem in crowdfunding, while private cost information is of second order.
Although only of second order, we show in the next section that private cost infor-
mation may nevertheless have strong effects. It intensifies incentive problems because it
allows the entrepreneur to use more sophisticated deviations. In the presence of both
moral hazard and private cost information, crowdfunding must deal with the double devi-
ation that the entrepreneur can combine lies about the cost structure with the intention
18PledgeMusic explicitly mentions that it uses deferred payments to prevent fraud: http://www.
pledgemusic.com/blog/220-preventing-fraud, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016.
19To prevent such false claims, Kickstarter, for instance, requires the entrepreneurs of gadgets to show
consumers an explicit prototype. As we discuss in more detail in footnote 28, the suspended crowdfunding
campaign “Skarp” illustrates that Kickstarter implements these rules rigorously.
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of taking the money and running. These double deviations are, however, rather intricate
and we present their formal analysis in the next section.
To summarize, we argued in this section that our hypothetical information-restricted,
payout-deferred, all-or-nothing, reward-based crowdfunding schemes can deal with moral
hazard effectively. They are, moreover, consistent with and shed light on the specific
features of popular crowdfunding schemes in practice. Yet, two open questions remain.
First, in what sense are these schemes optimal? Second, do they also remain feasible in
the presence of private cost information? The next section addresses these two questions
by studying the crowdfunding problem as one of optimal mechanism design. Based on
the model considered in this section, it analyzes an economic environment with both
entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information, in which the hypothetical
scheme that we derived in this section is generally optimal in terms of both efficiency and
profits.
4 Crowdfunding and mechanism design
In this section we analyze the entrepreneur’s problem as one of mechanism design and for-
malize the idea that payout-deferred, information-restricted, all-or-nothing reward-based
crowdfunding schemes implement optimal allocations.
4.1 The mechanism design setup
In order to treat the entrepreneur’s moral hazard, we use the framework of Myerson
(1982), which handles both ex ante private information and moral hazard. This gen-
eralized framework introduces a mediator who coordinates the communication between
economic agents and gives incentive-compatible recommendations concerning the unob-
servable actions that underly the moral hazard problem. One of the insights from this
analysis is that crowdfunding platforms play the role of a mediator exactly in the sense
of Myerson (1982).
Economic allocations. In order to cast the entrepreneur’s investment problem in a
framework of mechanism design, we first formalize the economic allocations. In partic-
ular, crowdfunding seeks to implement an allocation between one cash-constrained en-
trepreneur, player 0, and n consumers, players 1 to n. We denote by i ∈ N ≡ {1, . . . , n}
a generic consumer. An allocation involves monetary transfers and production decisions.
Concerning monetary transfers, consumers can make transfers to the entrepreneur both
before and after the entrepreneur’s investment decision. We denote the ex ante transfer
from consumer i to the entrepreneur by tai and the ex post transfer by t
p
i . Concerning the
production decisions, the allocation describes whether the entrepreneur invests, x0 = 1,
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or not, x0 = 0, and whether the entrepreneur produces a good for consumer i, xi = 1, or
not, xi = 0. Consequently, an economic allocation is a collection a = (t, x) of transfers




1, . . . , t
p
n) ∈ R
2n and outputs x = (x0, . . . , xn) ∈ X ≡ {0, 1}
n+1.
Feasible allocations. A defining feature of the crowdfunding problem is that the en-
trepreneur does not have the resources to finance the required investment I > 0. The
entrepreneur’s financial constraints imply the following feasibility restrictions on the avail-
able allocations. First, if the entrepreneur invests, the transfers from consumers must
cover investment costs I. Second, the entrepreneur cannot make any net positive ex ante
transfers to consumers. Finally, aggregate payments over both periods must be sufficient
to cover the entrepreneur’s investment and production costs. To express these feasibility










i ≥ x0I + c
∑
i∈N xi. (4)
In addition, an entrepreneur can only produce a good for a consumer if she invested. To
express this feasibility requirement, we say that the output schedule x is development-
feasible when the entrepreneur invested in its development if the good is produced for at
least one consumer:
∃i ∈ N : xi = 1 ⇒ x0 = 1. (5)
This condition logically implies that if x0 = 0 then xi = 0 for all i.
An allocation a ∈ A ≡ R2n×X is feasible if it satisfies (4) and (5).
Payoffs. Let the n-dimensional vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V ≡ {0, 1}
n represent the
valuation profile of consumers. We denote the probability of v ∈ V by π(v) and the
conditional probability of v-i ∈ V−1 ≡ {0, 1}
n−1 given vi as πi(v-i|vi). Assuming that
individual types are drawn independently, it holds that πi(v-i|0) = πi(v-i|1) so that we
can express the conditional probability simply as πi(v-i).
20 Moreover, we assume that
consumers are identical: πi(v-k) = πj(v-k) for any v-k ∈ V-1 and i, j.
In addition to the valuation profile v, the entrepreneur’s cost structure (I, c) is inde-
pendently drawn from a finite set of possible cost structures K ⊂ R+×[0, 1). Let ρ(I, c)
represent the probability that the entrepreneur’s project has the cost structure (I, c),
which is private information to the entrepreneur. For the special case, where K is a sin-
gleton, the entrepreneur has no private information concerning (I, c). This is the case we
studied in the previous section.
A feasible allocation a ∈ A yields a consumer i with value vi the payoff





20Although we introduce an independence assumption here to avoid possible complications due to
correlated private information, we stress that all our results hold also with correlated values. This is
because, even with independence, the efficient scheme does not leave any information rents.
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i − xic]− x0I. (7)
Efficiency. An output schedule x ∈ X is Pareto efficient in state (I, c, v) if and only if
it maximizes the aggregate net surplus
S(x|I, c, v) ≡
∑
i∈N (vi − c)xi − Ix0 = Π(a|I, c) +
∑
i∈N Ui(a|vi).
With respect to efficiency, two different types of production decisions matter: the
overall investment decision x0 and the individual production decisions xi. Given vl = 0 ≤
c < vh = 1, efficiency with respect to the individual allocations requires xi = vi. This
yields a surplus of
∑













we can characterize the Pareto efficient output schedule x∗ :K×V → X as follows. For
v ∈ V∗(I, c), it exhibits x∗0 = 1 and x
∗
i = vi for all i. For v ∈ V\V
∗(I, c), it exhibits
x∗0 = x
∗
i = 0 for all i.
21 Under an efficient output schedule, the entrepreneur invests only
if v ∈ V∗(I, c), implying that π∗(I, c) expresses the probability that the project is executed
with cost structure (I, c).
Although transfers are immaterial for Pareto efficiency, we must nevertheless ensure
that the efficient output schedule x∗(I, c, v) can indeed be made part of some feasible
allocation a ∈ A. In order to specify one such feasible allocation, we define the first-
best allocation a∗(I, c, v) = (t∗(I, c, v), x∗(I, c, v)) as follows. For v ∈ V∗(I, c), it ex-
hibits tai
∗(I, c, v) = vi and t
p
i
∗(I, c, v) = 0. For v ∈ V\V∗(I, c), a∗(I, c, v) is defined by
tai
∗(I, c, v) = tpi
∗(I, c, v) = 0. By construction a∗(I, c, v) is feasible and yields an ex ante










For future reference, we say that an output schedule x : K×V → X is development
efficient if for all (I, c, v) ∈ K×V ,
x0(I, c, v) = 1 ⇒ ∃i ∈ N : xi(I, c, v) = 1. (9)
This condition is the converse of development feasibility (5). If it does not hold, it implies
the inefficiency that there is a state (I, c, v) in which the entrepreneur invests I but
21For
∑
i∈N vi = n
∗(I, c), the output schedule x∗
0
= 1, x∗i = vi is also efficient, but this is immaterial
(and can only arise for the non-generic case that I is a multiple of 1− c).
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no consumer consumes the good. Although technically feasible, a schedule that is not
development efficient wastes the investment I > 0 and is not Pareto efficient.
For future reference, the following lemma summarizes these considerations.
Lemma 1 The first-best allocation {a∗(I, c, v) = (t∗(I, c, v), x∗(I, c, v))}(I,c,v)∈K×V is fea-
sible and exhibits an output schedule that is development efficient. It yields an expected




ρ(I, c) [W ∗(I, c)− π∗(I, c)I] .
Mechanisms. We next turn to mechanisms. A mechanism Γ is a set of rules between
the entrepreneur and the n consumers that induces a game. Its outcome is an allocation
a ∈ A with payoffs Π(a|I, c) and Ui(a|vi). In line with Myerson (1982), we interpret
the crowdfunding platform as the mediator who runs the mechanism. It coordinates the
communication between participants and enforces the rules the mechanism specifies for
the game.
A deterministic direct mechanism is a function γ : K×V → A, which induces the
following game. First, the entrepreneur and consumers simultaneously and independently
send a (confidential) report of their private information to the platform. Based on the





r, cr, vr) from the consumers and transfers them to the entrepreneur together
with the recommendation x0(I
r, cr, vr) of whether to invest.
To capture the moral hazard problem, we explicitly assume that the platform can-
not coerce the entrepreneur into following the recommendation x0 = 1. That is, the
entrepreneur is free to follow or reject it. If, however, the entrepreneur follows the recom-
mendation, the platform enforces the production schedule x(Ir, cr, vr) and the transfers
tpi (I
r, cr, vr). If the entrepreneur does not follow the recommendation to invest, but runs,
then individual production schedules are 0, and no ex post transfers flow, i.e., xi = t
p
i = 0.
Moreover, consumers forfeit their ex ante transfers tai , whereas the entrepreneur retains
only the amount αT so that the amount (1− α)T is lost.
We can express a payout-deferred, information-restricted, all-or-nothing, reward-based
crowdfunding scheme, as introduced in Section 3, by a direct mechanism γ = (t, x)
with the following structure. For each reported cost structure (I, c) there is a thresh-
old T (I, c) > 0 such that for each reported (i, v) ∈ N×V it holds
x0(I, c, v) =
{
1 if T (I, c) < n(v);
0 if T (I, c) > n(v);
xi(I, c, v)=
{
vi if T (I, c) < n(v);
0 if T (I, c) > n(v);
(10)
and
(tai (I, c, v), t
p
i (I, c, v)) =
{
(viI/n(v), vi[1− I/n(v)]) if T (I, c) < n(v);






Hence, we say that a mechanism γ is a crowdfunding mechanism if for some threshold
function T : K → R+ it satisfies (10) and (11), and in case T (I, c) =
∑
i∈N vi, it satisfies
for this knife-edge either
(x0(I, c, v), xi(I, c, v), t
a
i (I, c, v), t
p
i (I, c, v)) = (0, 0, 0, 0) (12)
or
(x0(I, c, v), xi(I, c, v), t
a
i (I, c, v), t
p
i (I, c, v)) = (1, vi, viI/n(v), vi[1− I/n(v)]) . (13)
In order to also address stochastic direct mechanisms, we write direct mechanisms
as distributions over deterministic direct mechanisms. That is, we define a (stochastic)
direct mechanism as a collection Γ = {(pl, γl)}l∈L = {(pl, tl, xl)}l∈L with L ≡ {1, . . . , L},
∑
l∈L pl = 1, and for all l ∈ L it holds pl > 0 and that γl is a deterministic direct
mechanism. The interpretation of Γ is that, first, the platform draws the direct mechanism
γl = (tl, xl) with probability pl and, subsequently, executes it as explained above. A direct
mechanism is deterministic if L = 1.
In the following we show that efficient mechanisms do not require randomization.
Moreover, it is also straightforward to argue that deterministic production decisions xi
and transfers t are optimal. Yet, as we explain in more detail below, the entrepreneur’s
private cost information may result in constrained efficient mechanisms that necessarily
exhibit some minor randomization. These schemes randomize between (at most) two
crowdfunding mechanisms with identical target functions T (I, c) but with one that sat-
isfies (12) and the other (13). This randomization is due to the discrete number of
consumers.
Feasible mechanisms. We next introduce the concept of feasible mechanisms, which, in
line with standard mechanism design, are direct mechanisms that are incentive-compatible
and individual rational.
A direct mechanism γ is incentive-compatible if its induced game has a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which 1) consumers are truthful; they reveal their values honestly, i.e.,
vri = vi, and 2) the entrepreneur is truthful and (on path) obedient; she reveals her costs
(I, c) honestly and follows the recommendation upon honestly revealing her costs.22
To formalize the notion of truthful revelation by consumers for a (possibly random)











22In line with Myerson (1982) and the applicability of the revelation principle, obedience is imposed




















Consequently, we say that a mechanism Γ = {pl, γl}l∈L is C-truthful if
UΓi (0|0) ≥ U
Γ
i (1|0) and U
Γ
i (1|1) ≥ U
Γ
i (0|1), ∀i ∈ N . (14)
To formalize the notion of the entrepreneur’s truthfulness and obedience, we define
for a deterministic direct mechanism γ = (t, x) the conditional profit
Πγ(Ir, cr|I, c, v) ≡ Π(γ(Ir, cr, v)|I, c);
and the set T γ(I, c) as the set of aggregate ex ante transfers which γ induces conditional
on a recommendation of investment and the entrepreneur reporting the cost structure
(I, c):




i (I, c, v) = T ∧ x0(I, c, v) = 1}.
Given this set we define, for any T ∈ T γ(I, c), the set Vγ(T |I, c) of valuation profiles
for which the mechanism γ induces the recommendation to invest together with ex ante
transfers T :




i (I, c, v) = T}.
Hence, given a mechanism Γ = {(pl, γl)}l∈L, the probability that the platform will
send a recommendation to invest together with ex ante transfers T conditional on the
entrepreneur reporting (I, c) is






After reporting the cost structure (I, c) and receiving a recommendation to invest
together with an ex ante transfer T ∈ T Γ(I, c) ≡ ∪lT
γl(I, c), the entrepreneur has some
belief ηΓ(v, l|T, I, c) that the consumers’ valuation is v and the platform has picked the
deterministic direct mechanism γl. This belief is Bayes-consistent if





P Γ(T |I, c)
if (v, l) ∈ Vγl(T |I, c)×L;
0 otherwise.
(15)
After reporting the cost structure (Ir, cr), obtaining the recommendation to invest and
an ex ante transfer T , an entrepreneur with cost structure (I, c) anticipates obtaining a
profit of






ηΓ(v, l|T, Ir, cr)Πγl(Ir, cr|I, c, v)
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from obediently following the recommendation to invest.
Finally, we can express the (maximum) expected profit of an entrepreneur with cost
structure (I, c) who reports (Ir, cr) as
ΠΓ(Ir, cr|I, c) ≡
∑
T∈T Γ(Ir,cr)








γl(Ir, cr|I, c, v). (16)
The first term in this expression collects the events that after reporting the cost struc-
ture (Ir, cr), the entrepreneur receives the recommendation to invest, together with some
transfer T . In this case, she can decide whether to follow the recommendation or take the
money and run. The maximum-operator reflects the entrepreneur’s optimal decision given
her updated belief after receiving the transfer T . The second term collects the events of
the entrepreneur receiving the recommendation not to invest.
With this notation, we say that a mechanism Γ = {(pl, γl)}l∈L is (on path) obedient if
an entrepreneur, who reveals her cost structure (I, c) honestly, is better off investing than
she would be if she took the money and ran:
ΠΓo (T |I, c, I, c) ≥ αT , for all T ∈ T
Γ(I, c) and (I, c) ∈ K. (17)
Moreover, we say that a mechanism Γ = {(pl, γl)}l∈L is E-truthful if
ΠΓ(I, c) ≥ ΠΓ(Ir, cr|I, c), for all (I, c, Ir, cr) ∈ K×K, (18)
with ΠΓ(I, c) ≡ ΠΓ(I, c|I, c).
We say that a direct mechanism is incentive-compatible if and only if it is C-truthful,
E-truthful, and on path obedient.
As participation is voluntary it must yield the consumers and the entrepreneur at least
their outside option. Taking these outside options as 0, the entrepreneur’s participation is
not an issue because any feasible allocation yields the entrepreneur a non-negative payoff.
Hence, her participation constraint is satisfied for every outcome and therefore even in an
ex post sense.
In contrast, a feasible allocation does not guarantee that a consumer will obtain his
outside option of zero. As noted in the previous section, all-or-nothing crowdfunding
schemes have, in the absence of moral hazard, the attractive feature that they respect
participation constraints even after a consumer learns whether the crowdfunding campaign
has been a success or a failure. Consumers, therefore, do not regret their participation.
Yet, rather than imposing ex post participation constraints by assumption, we will assume
a less restrictive form of participation. This allows us to show the extent to which ex post
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individual rationality of the optimal mechanism is a result rather than an assumption.23
In particular, we assume that the consumer has to receive his outside option conditional
on his own type and the project’s cost structure. Formally, we say that an incentive-
compatible direct mechanism is individual rational if for all (i, I, c) ∈ N×K it holds




i (0|I, c, 0) ≥ 0; (19)
and




i (1|I, c, 1) ≥ 0. (20)
To summarize, we say that a mechanism Γ is (strictly) feasible, if it is incentive-
compatible and individual rational and its induced allocations a(I, c, v) are feasible. Fol-
lowing the previous definitions, Γ = {(pl, γl)}l∈L with γl = (tl, xl) is feasible if and only if








li(I, c, v) + t
p
li(I, c, v) ≥ xl0(I, c, v)I + c
∑
i∈N xli(I, c, v), ∀(l, I, c, v); (22)
∃i ∈ N : xli(I, c, v) = 1 ⇒ xl0(I, c, v) = 1, ∀(l, I, c, v); (23)
UΓi (0|0) ≥ U
Γ
i (1|0), ∀i; (24)
UΓi (1|1) ≥ U
Γ
i (0|1), ∀i; (25)
ΠΓo (T |I, c, I, c) ≥ αT, ∀(I, c), ∀T ∈ T
Γ(I, c); (26)
ΠΓ(I, c) ≥ ΠΓ(I ′, c′|I, c), ∀(I, c, I ′, c′); (27)
UΓi (I, c|0) ≥ 0, ∀(i, I, c); (28)
UΓi (I, c|1) ≥ 0, ∀(i, I, c). (29)




















(vi − c)xi(I, c, v)− Ix0(I, c, v)
]
.
Similarly, a feasible mechanism Γ yields the entrepreneur with costs (I, c) an expected






v∈V π(v)Π(γl(I, c, v)|I, c).
23This approach also mitigates the problem that the extent to which ex post individual rationality
constrains crowdfunding platforms is unclear. As it turns out, in practice it is possible for consumers
to not honor their pledges after a successful campaign. For instance, Kickstarter lists such “dropped
pledges” in its receipt to entrepreneurs and deducts them from the entrepreneur’s transfer.
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Finally, we say that two feasible mechanisms Γ and Γ′ are payoff-equivalent if they
lead to identical payoffs for each consumer type vi in each cost state:
UΓi (I, c|vi) = U
Γ′
i (I, c|vi), for all (i, I, c, vi) ∈ N×K×{0, 1};
and for each entrepreneur type (I, c):
ΠΓ(I, c) = ΠΓ
′
(I, c), for all (I, c) ∈ K.
Implementability. A (stochastic) allocation function f : K×V → ∆A specifies for any
cost structure (I, c) and any value profile v a distribution over the feasible allocations
a ∈ A. It is implementable if there exists some (not necessarily direct) mechanism such
that the induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in which, for each
(I, c, v) ∈ K×V , the allocation coincides with f(I, c, v). In this case, we say that the
mechanism implements the allocation function f .
Likewise, a (stochastic) output schedule x : K×V → ∆X specifies for any (I, c, v) ∈ K×V
a probability distribution over output schedules x ∈ X .24 It is implementable if there exists
some mechanism such that the induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome
in which, for each (I, c, v) ∈ K×V , the induced output coincides with x(I, c, v). In this
case, we say the mechanism implements output schedule x(·).
Appealing to the (mediated) revelation principle in Myerson (1982), an allocation
function f(·) is implementable if and only if there exists a feasible mechanism Γ such that
it implements f . Likewise, an output schedule x(·) is implementable if and only if there
exists a feasible mechanism Γ such that it implements x. Hence, as usual, the revelation
principle motivates incentive-compatibility as a defining feature of feasibility.
One question that initially arises is whether the efficient output schedule x∗ is always
implementable. Our first proposition confirms that this is not the case.
Proposition 1 The efficient output schedule x∗ is not always implementable.
Intuitively, the inefficiency results from a tension between the entrepreneur’s budget
constraint and the moral hazard problem. So consumers can ensure that the entrepreneur
realizes her project, simply giving her the required amount I does not suffice. Due to the
moral hazard problem, she must also be given an explicit incentive to invest this amount
properly and not run off with it. The proposition shows that for the efficient output
schedule x∗ this is, in general, not possible.
24In contrast, deterministic output schedules are functions x : K×V → X .
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4.2 Optimal allocations and mechanisms
A (possibly constrained) efficient mechanism Γ̆ = {(p̆l, t̆l, x̆l)}l∈L maximizes S
Γ subject
to constraints (21)–(29). In order to solve this maximization problem, we follow the
usual approach in mechanism design to focus first on a relaxed maximization problem
that considers only a subset – albeit the relevant subset – of the overall incentive and
individual rationality constraints. In particular, we disregard the individual rationality





P Γ(T |I ′, c′)αT, ∀(I, c, I ′, c′). (30)
The constraint is weaker than (27), because its right-hand side is larger than the right-
hand side of (30), whereas their left-hand sides are identical.25
Formally, we say that Γ is weakly feasible if it satisfies constraints (21)–(26), (28), and
(30) and an output schedule x̌ : K×V → ∆X is weakly-implementable if there exists a
weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌. A weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ is optimal if it maximizes
SΓ over all weakly feasible mechanisms.
In the following, we derive an optimal weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ with the feature
that it is also (strictly) feasible. Hence, it also represents a constrained efficient mechanism
Γ̆. In particular, we show that such a mechanism is a crowdfunding mechanism, i.e., there
is a threshold function T (I, c) so that all the deterministic mechanisms γl in Γ̆ satisfy
(10)–(13).
We first derive a series of lemmas that allow us to simplify the maximization problem.
The first lemma establishes the relatively intuitive result that development-efficiency is a
necessary feature of optimal weakly feasible mechanisms.
Lemma 2 A weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L is optimal only if each x̌l is
development-efficient.
The next lemma validates the suggestion of the previous section that, in order to
optimally control entrepreneurial moral hazard, a mechanism uses deferred payments and
limits the entrepreneur’s information. In particular, it shows that development-efficiency
is a sufficient condition under which it is optimal to initially provide the entrepreneur only
with the investment amount I and, hence, minimize the information which she gleans from
receiving a recommendation to invest. The result is an illustration of Myerson’s general
observation that, accompanying a recommendation, mediators should give agents only
25Referring to (16), it considers only one element within the maximum operator and for x0(I
′, c′, v) = 0,





′, c′, v) + tpli(I
′, c′, v)] ≥ 0.
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the minimum information possible, as more information only makes it harder to satisfy
incentive-compatibility.
Lemma 3 Suppose Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L is weakly feasible and {x̌l}l∈L are development-
efficient. Then there are transfer schedules {t̂l}l∈L such that (21) binds and the direct





li(I, c, v) ≥ c
∑
i∈N xli(I, c, v), ∀(l, I, c, v) ∈ L×K×V . (31)
Because Lemma 2 shows that an optimal weakly feasible mechanism is development-
efficient, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to weakly feasible direct
mechanisms that give the entrepreneur exactly the amount I if the entrepreneur is to
develop the product.
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3 allows us to considerably simplify the optimization prob-
lem. Indeed, if the feasibility constraint (21) binds then T Γ(I, c) = {I} so that the
obedience constraint (26) has to hold only with regard to T = I. By defining, for an
output schedule x ∈ Rn+1, the set and probability


















xl(I, c)αI, ∀(I, c)∈K; (32)
and the relaxed truthfulness constraint (30) to
ΠΓ(I, c) ≥ πΓ(I ′, c′)αI ′, ∀(I, c, I ′, c′) ∈ K×K, (33)




Following the previous two lemmas, there is no loss of generality to focus on weakly
feasible mechanisms γ̌ = (ť, x̌) that satisfy (23), (24), (25), (28), (31), (32), and (33),
and (21) in equality. Given this observation, we next prove that optimal weakly feasible
mechanisms do not produce a product for consumers who do not value them.
Lemma 4 A weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L is optimal only if it holds
that
xil(I, c, 0, v-i) = 0, ∀(l, i, I, c, v-i) ∈ L×N×K×V-i. (34)
The result sounds intuitive, since it implies that an optimal weakly feasible mechanism
does not display any form of artificial inefficiency. It is, however, not immediate because,
in general, artificial inefficiencies may help to relax incentive constraints. The next lemma
shows that it also implies that there is no loss of generality in assuming that an optimal
weakly feasible mechanism leaves no rents to consumers.
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Lemma 5 Suppose Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L is weakly feasible and x̌l satisfies (34). Then there
exists a weakly feasible mechanism Γ̂ = {(p̌l, t̂l, x̌l)}l∈L which yields the same aggregate
surplus SΓ̌ and exhibits
U γ̂li (0|I, c, 0) = U
γ̂l
i (1|I, c, 1) = 0, ∀(l, i, I, c) ∈ L×N×K. (35)
The lemma provides the insight that optimal weakly feasible mechanisms extract all
rents from consumers and assign them as revenues to the entrepreneur. The intuition as
to why this rent extraction is optimal follows directly from the moral hazard problem: by
giving all rents in the form of deferred payments to the entrepreneur, she has the least
incentives to run with the money.
As we show in the next lemma, the rent extraction result implies that there is no
conflict between maximizing the aggregate surplus and maximizing the entrepreneur’s ex
ante expected profits. In order to make this statement explicit, define for a mechanism














Lemma 6 It is without loss of generality to assume that both an optimal weakly feasible
mechanism Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L maximizes the entrepreneur’s ex ante expected profits Π
Γ,
and exhibits Sx̌l(I, c) = Πγ̌l(I, c) for all (l, I, c) so that for all (I, c) it also holds that
ΠΓ̌(I, c) = SΓ̌(I, c).
To summarize, Lemmas 2 to 6 imply that, with respect to the optimal weakly feasible




tali(I, c, v) = xl0(I, c, v)I, ∀(l, I, c, v); (36)
∑
i∈N
tpli(I, c, v) ≥ c
∑
i∈N
xli(I, c, v), ∀(l, I, c, v); (37)
∃i ∈ N : xli(I, c, v) = 1 ⇒ xl0(I, c, v) = 1, ∀(l, I, c, v); (38)
Uγli (1|I, c, 1) = 0, ∀(l, i, I, c); (39)









li(I, c, v)− cxli(I, c, v)) ≥ π
Γ(I, c)αI, ∀(I, c); (41)
xli(I, c, 0, v-i) = 0, ∀(l, I, c, v-i); (42)
SΓ(I, c) ≥ πΓ(I ′, c′)αI ′, ∀(I, c, I ′, c′). (43)
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Constraint (43) effectively represents the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint (18). The
insight that the mechanism leaves all rents to the entrepreneur in order to optimally deal
with the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem, enables us to rewrite this constraint as
depending only on output schedules and not on transfers.
Since the deterministic version of this constraint turns out to play a key role for
implementability, we say that an output schedule x ∈ Rn+1 is affluent if for all (I, c) ∈ K
it holds
Sx(I, c) ≥ Φ(x) ≡ max
(Ĩ,c̃)∈K
απx(Ĩ , c̃)Ĩ . (44)
We moreover denote by (Ī(x), c̄(x)) a maximizer of the right-hand side of (44). Note that
for a deterministic mechanism Γ = (1, γ1) = (1, x1, t1), constraint (43) amounts to the
requirement that x1 is affluent. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 The efficient output schedule x∗ is implementable if and only if it is afflu-
ent. If implementable, a crowdfunding mechanism implements it and thereby maximizes
both aggregate surplus and the entrepreneur’s ex ante expected profits.
The proposition identifies affluency as the crucial condition: it is both necessary and
sufficient for the implementability of the efficient output schedule. The intuition behind
this result is that the entrepreneur needs to receive a rent of at least Φ(x∗) to induce
her to invest properly rather than employing the combined strategy of misreporting her
cost structure and, subsequently, taking the money and running. Since the consumers
ultimately pay this rent, the project then has to generate a surplus of at least Φ(x∗) so
that the consumers’ participation is still individual rational. The efficient output schedule
x∗, however, only guarantees such a surplus if it is affluent.
More generally, we can interpret the required rent Φ(x) as the agency costs of imple-
menting some output schedule x. To obtain more insights concerning the extent to which
moral hazard and private cost information are responsible for these agency costs, note
that if the entrepreneur cannot falsify her cost structure, the output schedule x induces
the entrepreneur to invest if
Sx(I, c) ≥ Φm(x) ≡ α · πx(I, c)I.
This suggests interpreting Φm(x) as the agency cost associated with moral hazard and
the remaining part
Φi(x) ≡ Φ(x)− Φm(x) = α ·
[
πx(Ī(x), c̄(x))Ī(x)− πx(I, c)I
]
≥ 0
as the agency cost associated with private information about the cost structure.
The proposition further shows that if there is no moral hazard problem (α = 0), the
efficient output schedule is implementable even if the entrepreneur has private information
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about the cost structure. In this case, agency costs Φm(x) and Φi(x) are both zero.
Hence, private cost information alone does not lead to distortions in crowdfunding. This
observation formalizes the insight of Section 3 that entrepreneurial moral hazard is a
first-order problem in crowdfunding while private cost information is of second order.
It also demonstrates that the presence of private cost information does not alter the
intuition behind the inefficiency result of Proposition 1. Effectively, the existence of
a tension between the entrepreneur’s budget constraint and the moral hazard problem
remains solely responsible for the inefficiencies, and prevents the implementability of the
efficient output.
Yet, even though private cost information by itself cannot lead to an inefficiency, it
does, however, intensify the moral hazard problem. This is because with private cost
information, consumers have to grant enough rents to prevent the double deviation of
the entrepreneur combining lies about the cost structure with the intent to take the
money and run. In the extreme, this multiplier effect destroys all potential benefits from
crowdfunding. In particular, if there is a cost structure (I, c) in K for which Sx
∗
(I, c) = 0,
then an affluent output schedule necessarily exhibits πx(Ĩ , c̃) = 0 for all (Ĩ , c̃) ∈ K. This
means that crowdfunding is ineffective: for any demand realization and any cost structure,
implementability implies x0 = 0.
We next address the question of which constrained efficient output schedule is optimal
when the efficient output schedule is not affluent. Note that affluency is a necessary
condition for an implementable output schedule x. Hence, an intuitive approach toward
finding the constrained efficient output level is to start with the efficient output x∗ and
adapt it to make it affluent. Because the efficient output x∗ maximizes Sx(·) and, hence,
the left-hand side of (44), such an adaptation requires a change in x that lowers its right-
hand side. That is, the output schedule should decrease πx(·). Effectively, this means
lowering the likelihood that the entrepreneur will receive a recommendation to invest when
reporting the cost structure (Ī(x), c̄(x)). Intuitively, this change reduces the profitability
of the double deviation to misreport the cost structure as (Ī(x), c̄(x)) and subsequently
take the money and run.
The required adaptation of x∗ implies a downward distortion of the output schedule:
the constrained efficient mechanism has to recommend the entrepreneur not to invest
for some demand revelations that yield a positive surplus. Hence, lowering πx comes at
the cost of underinvestment. These costs are minimized when the mechanism makes the
inefficient recommendation not to invest for those demand realizations that yield the least
surplus. In terms of crowdfunding, this means that the crowdfunding target T is raised
above the efficient one, as the demand realizations closest to target yield the least.
The reasoning to adapt x∗ toward some affluent output schedule suggests that also the
constrained efficient mechanism is a crowdfunding mechanism, but with an inefficiently
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high target T . Since the adaptation away from x∗ comes at a cost, the crowdfunding
target should be raised such that the affluency constraint (44) is just met. Due to the
discreteness of the problem, this is generally not possible with deterministic output sched-
ules. As a consequence, we cannot exclude the possibility that the optimal mechanism is
stochastic and displays the minor form of randomness in that it randomizes between two
crowdfunding schemes such that the affluency constraint is satisfied with equality.
In two steps, we formally confirm that the heuristic arguments presented above are
correct. In a first lemma, we show that optimal weakly feasible mechanisms necessarily
exhibit a single cutoff T for each cost structure (I, c). This implies that crowdfunding
mechanisms implement them. Proposition 3 then shows that these weakly feasible mech-
anisms are actually (strictly) feasible.
Lemma 7 A weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L that satisfies (36)–(43) is
optimal only if for each (I, c) ∈ K there exists some T ∈ N such that for all (l, i, v) ∈
L×N×V it holds
x̌l0(I, c, v) =
{
1 if n(v) > T ;
0 if n(v) < T ;
and x̌li(I, c, v) =
{
vi if n(v) > T ;
0 if n(v) < T.
(45)
The next proposition shows that any output schedule that satisfies (45), is actually
implementable by a (strictly) feasible mechanism that, in addition to (36)–(43), also
satisfies properties (11)–(13).
Proposition 3 If the efficient output x∗ is not affluent, the optimal allocation is con-
strained efficient. A crowdfunding mechanism implements it and thereby also maximizes
the entrepreneur’s ex ante expected profits.
5 Interpretation and extensions
In this section, we relate our formal analysis and results to crowdfunding in practice.
Moreover, we discuss the extent to which additional economic forces strengthen or weaken
our results.
5.1 Interpretations
Our first observation concerns the role of the crowdfunding platform itself. In our formal
analysis the platform structures the communication between entrepreneur and consumers,
and executes the mechanism. This is consistent with the role that crowdfunding plat-
forms play in practice. Platforms such as Kickstarter emphasize that they themselves
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are not directly involved in the development of the product and take no responsibility
for the entrepreneur’s project. Wikipedia therefore refers to these internet platforms as
“internet-mediated registries” and see them as “a moderating organization.”26 Tellingly,
the technical term of the platform’s role in the theory of mechanism design is “mediator”
(e.g., Myerson, 1982). Although it seems the platform’s role is only minor, it is neverthe-
less crucial. Due to commitment and communication problems, neither the entrepreneur
nor the consumers can perform this role.
A further notable feature of optimal mechanisms is that they do not exhibit negative
transfers. Hence, consumers do not receive any money from the entrepreneur – meaning
the entrepreneur does not share any of her revenues. As a result, the optimal crowdfunding
scheme is reward-based instead of investment-based; it does not turn consumers into real
investors. This feature is consistent with popular reward-crowdfunding platforms such as
Kickstarter, which explicitly prohibit any monetary transfers to crowdfunders.27
In line with the many all-or-nothing crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, the
direct mechanisms that are optimal in our framework condition the investment decision
on the sum of reported valuations rather than each individual consumer report. Clearly,
the conditional investment is crucial for exploiting crowdfunding’s fundamental benefit
of extracting demand information directly from consumers. Our results show that moral
hazard and private cost information do not undermine this fundamental benefit of crowd-
funding.
The analysis further reveals that deferred payments are crucial for controlling moral
hazard. And, optimally, the entrepreneur should not learn the exact amount of these
deferred payments. In the mechanism design problem, we derived an optimal mechanism
with symmetric transfer schedules. In case of an investment, all consumers who value
the product, equally share the investment cost upfront and make identical deferred pay-
ments later. The formal analysis shows, however, that the optimum determines only the
aggregate payments of consumers and not the individual ones. Hence, instead of sharing
the initial investment by all consumers, an optimal mechanism can just as well ask for
some consumers to pay in full upfront, while other consumers only pay later. In Section
3, we exploited this feature when arguing that current crowdfunding platforms allow an
indirect implementation of opaque deferred payments via the after-market and by offer-
ing a dynamic scheme which allows consumers to use conditional pledging strategies. In
terms of a direct mechanism, these conditional strategies induce the asymmetric payment
schedules (tai , t
p




i ) = (0, 1).
26See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdfunding and https://www.kickstarter.com/help/
faq/kickstarter%20basics#Acco for explicit statements concerning the accountability of projects, last
retrieved Sep. 10, 2016.
27See https://www.kickstarter.com/rules?ref=footer, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016.
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Our analysis shows, moreover, that in the presence of private cost information the set
of possible cost structures, K, affects the efficiency of crowdfunding in two ways. First,
the efficient output is implementable only if it is affluent, which means that for all cost
structures inK, the project yields enough rents. Second, the lower the surpluses associated
with the least favorable cost structure, the more the constrained efficient mechanism
has to distort investment downwards for more favorable cost structures. Hence, even
though our results demonstrate that, in direct comparison to moral hazard, private cost
information is only a second-order problem, it may nevertheless substantially amplify the
moral hazard problem. In particular, the more expensive cost structures exert a negative
externality on projects with a more favorable cost structure. This negative externality
implies that, for controlling moral hazard, the set of possible cost structures plays a crucial
role. This is consistent with the observation that, in practice, crowdfunding platforms
have strict rules concerning the projects that they allow on their platforms. For instance,
for manufacturing products, Kickstarter requires a working prototype and bans the use
of photorealistic renderings.28 The platform explains that these rules are to ensure that
entrepreneurs offer only serious projects, generating genuine benefits. Since our results
clarify that only in the presence of moral hazard does excluding such non-serious projects
make sense, these rules indicate that platforms do view moral hazard as a potential
problem.
5.2 Extensions
The starting point of our analysis was the idea that aggregate demand uncertainty pro-
vides an economic rationale for reward-crowdfunding schemes. We subsequently presented
an economic model for which such crowdfunding schemes are indeed fully optimal – even
in the presence of entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. In the re-
mainder of this section, we discuss the extent to which additional economic forces may
strengthen or weaken our results.
Limited consumer reach. Motivated by the observation that crowdfunding allows
entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before they make an investment, our formal
analysis took this idea to the extreme. It implicitly assumed that the entrepreneur could
28See https://www.kickstarter.com/rules/prototypes, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016. The
crowdfunding campaign “Skarp” illustrates that Kickstarter takes these rules very seriously.
This campaign raised more than 4 million dollars, making it one of Kickstarter’s largest
campaigns ever. Yet, after Kickstarter discovered that the project did not have a work-
ing prototype, it cancelled the campaign. See https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/skarp/
the-skarp-laser-razor-21st-century-shaving last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016. (The fact that most
crowdfunding campaigns fail to reach their target level, makes it efficient for Kickstarter to check up only
on those projects, whose campaign ends successfully.)
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contract with every potential consumer. Given this extreme position, the revelation princi-
ple implies that there is no loss of generality in assuming that mechanisms allow consumers
to acquire the product only through the mechanism.
Yet, in practice, not all consumers are able to participate in the mechanism. A share
of consumers may, for instance, fail to notice the crowdfunding scheme, not have access to
the internet or only arrive in the market after the product has been developed. Hence, a
relevant extension of our framework is to consider mechanisms which, for some exogenous
reason, reach only a limited number of consumers.
In order to make this more concrete, consider an extension of the model in which
it is known that only a share of β ∈ (0, 1) can partake in the mechanism. This purely
proportional case, that a consumer’s ability to participate is independent of his valuation,
already yields new insights.
Note first that the crowdfunding scheme is still able to reduce demand uncertainty:
a pledge by ñ consumers means that, in expectation, ñ(β) ≡ ñ/β consumer will like the
product. It follows that the previous analysis still applies when we factor in the parameter
β. That is, investment is socially efficient if
ñ(β) ≥ I/(1− c) ⇒ ñ ≥ n∗(β) ≡ βI/(1− c).
A first new insight of this extension is, however, that, with limited consumer reach,
deferred payments may not be needed explicitly for the reward-based crowdfunding scheme
(p, T ) to withstand moral hazard, even for the extreme case α = 1. To see this, note that
if the scheme can reach only a share β of potential consumers then inequality (1), which
describes the condition under which the entrepreneur has a strict incentive to run, changes
to




Hence, whereas under full consumer reach (β = 1), a reward-based crowdfunding scheme
(p, T ) without deferred payments is unable to withstand moral hazard if α > 1−c/p−I/P ,
it does withstand moral hazard when its consumer reach is limited to β < β̄. The reason
for this follows the logic behind deferred payments: the limited consumer reach effectively
implies that a pledge level P constitutes a deferred payment of (1− β)P/β > 0.29
A second new insight is that, when the share of crowdfunding consumers is small, con-
sumers necessarily become real investors. To see this, note that because the entrepreneur
needs the amount I to develop the product, the (average) ex ante transfer of a pledging
consumer needs to be at least I/ñ. When β is small so that n∗(β) is smaller than 1, it
follows that for ñ close to n∗(β), the consumer’s ex ante transfer exceeds his willingness
to pay. Individual rationality then implies that the ex post transfer to the consumer is
29It is precisely by appealing to limited consumer reach that Chang (2015) and Chemla and Tinn
(2016) argue that the specific crowdfunding schemes they consider can withstand moral hazard.
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negative, meaning that after the investment the entrepreneur refunds consumers part of
their money. Hence, the optimal mechanism turns consumers into real investors; they
finance the entrepreneur’s investment and share in her revenues.
As noted, reward crowdfunding schemes such as Kickstarter explicitly prohibit mon-
etary transfers to crowdfunders. Our formal analysis confirms that this is indeed not
needed if the investment I is small compared to the number of potential consumers that
the platform can reach. For relatively large investments, however, such restrictions may
matter.30
Finally, note that all-or-nothing crowdfunding projects also give consumers an incen-
tive to participate in the crowdfunding scheme if the target level has not been met. That
is because a consumer may be pivotal for the decision to invest and produce the good.
Hence, facing a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) a consumer is strictly better off participat-
ing (provided he expects the price not to be lowered in the after-market, which in our
setup would indeed not be the case). Hence, next to eliciting the consumer’s valuation in
an incentive-compatible manner, crowdfunding schemes also exhibit features that make
participation incentive-compatible.31
Price discrimination. We assumed that consumers either do not value the good or
value it at the same positive amount. This assumption allows us to focus on the problem
of aggregate demand uncertainty and sidestep issues of price discrimination.
Indeed, economic theory has shown that, with respect to price discrimination, it is
generally suboptimal for the entrepreneur to condition the execution of the project on the
sum of pledges. Cornelli (1996) makes this observation in a model in which consumers’
valuations are drawn from a continuum. She shows that, to achieve optimal price discrim-
ination, the actual composition rather than the sum itself matters. More recently, Ellman
and Hurkens (2015) extended this result to discrete valuations and show that conditioning
the project’s execution on the sum of pledges is generally profit-maximizing only when,
as in our context, the support contains only two buyer valuations.
Our general insight that entrepreneurial moral hazard does not destroy the potential
30Ordanini et al. (2011) report the case of Cameesa, a Chicago-based clothing company
which in 2008 introduced a reward-based crowdfunding model by which it also shared its rev-
enue with its crowdfunders. Supporters of a successful project not only obtained the shirt,
but also shared in some of the revenue of its future sales. (see http://www.cnet.com/news/
cameesa-a-threadless-where-customers-are-also-investors/, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016).
31Next to the probability to be pivotal and the consumer’s expectation of the price in the after-market,
a consumer’s specific incentives to participate will also depend on other factors from which our model
abstracts: time-preferences, the probability that the project will succeed, and the possibility that the
consumer can better judge the product after it has been successfully produced. Yet, given that there is
no private information about these factors, we can, without affecting qualitative results, integrate these
factors in the analysis as a discount factor between the consumer’s value before and after investment.
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benefits of crowdfunding extends, however, to models with non-trivial concerns for price
discrimination and, in particular, with more than two valuations. To see this, note that
the new issue that arises in such models is that eliciting the consumers’ private information
requires them giving a strictly positive information rent. As a result, incentive-compatible
mechanisms cannot assign the entire surplus to the entrepreneur. As our results show, a
prevention of moral hazard does, however, not require that the entrepreneur extracts the
full surplus; she just needs a large enough share to make the investment affluent. It then
depends on the exact distributions and parameter constellations, whether crowdfunding
schemes that condition on the sum of pledges can achieve full efficiency. In general
however, consumers’ information rents reduce the set of affluent investment profiles and,
therefore, tends to lead to more distorted outcomes.
Hence, for the literature that restricts attention to comparing specific crowdfunding
schemes but abstracts from moral hazard (e.g. Belleflamme et al., 2014 and Ellman and
Hurkens, 2015), our results imply that the presence of moral hazard does not destroy the
potential benefits which this literature identifies. In particular, our insight that dynamic
crowdfunding schemes which condition on the sum of pledges allow consumers to use
conditional pledging strategies that implement opaque deferred payments and thereby
mitigate moral hazard, extends to such models.
Alternative funding. By enabling direct interaction with consumers prior to the in-
vestment, crowdfunding leads to a transformation of the entrepreneurial business model.
Ordanini et al. (2011) emphasize that this transformation takes place at a fundamental
level, blurring the traditional separation of finance and marketing.32
Although this fundamental perspective is correct if one views reward crowdfunding as
an exclusive alternative to specialized venture capitalists, we emphasize that crowdfunding
and venture capital financing are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, we view the
two forms as highly complementary. In line with Diamond (1984), we see the advantage
of venture capitalists (or banks) in reducing the moral hazard problem, which in terms
of the paper’s model implies a reduction in α. In contrast, the strength of crowdfunding
lies in learning about consumer demand for the project.
Because the analysis of a full-fledged model which combines venture capitalists and
crowdfunding lies outside the scope of the current paper, we simply mention that we see no
reason why a venture capitalist may not use crowdfunding to learn about demand or why
after a successful crowdfunding campaign an entrepreneur may not approach a venture
capitalist. Indeed, Dingman (2013) reports that exactly this occurred in the case of the
Pebble Smart Watch. Venture capitalists decided to support the entrepreneur’s project
only after a successful crowdfunding campaign on Kickstarter. Quoting a managing part-
32In contrast, “investment-based crowdfunding” upholds the traditional separation between finance
and marketing, because the consumers and the crowd-investors typically do not coincide.
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ner of a venture capitalist firm: “What venture capital always wants is to get validation,
and with Kickstarter, he [i.e., the entrepreneur] could prove there was a market.”
When the crowdfunding mechanism is constrained efficient, it may – as we already
pointed out in the introduction – even be profitable for venture capitalists to invest in
projects whose crowdfunding campaign have failed. Constrained efficient campaigns set
an inefficiently high target. Hence, campaigns that fall short of the target by a relatively
small amount, reveal the information that, while there is enough demand for the project to
be profitable – i.e., have a positive net present value – there is not enough demand to also
control the excessive moral hazard problem associated with crowdfunding. For a venture
capitalist, who can better control the moral hazard problem than the crowd, an investment
in a project with a failed crowdfunding campaign may therefore still be profitable. This
is consistent with Kickstarter’s own observation that unsuccessful campaigns which raise
a substantial part of their goal often get alternative funding.
6 Conclusion
Crowdfunding provides innovation in that, prior to the product’s development, an en-
trepreneur contracts with consumers. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this enables
entrepreneurs to use crowdfunding as a tool to screen for valuable projects and thereby
improve investment decisions. Our formal analysis confirms that optimal mechanisms do
indeed take on this role of screening, even in the presence of moral hazard and private in-
formation. All-or-nothing reward crowdfunding schemes such as those used by Kickstarter
and other crowdfunding platforms implement the crucial features of these mechanisms. In
particular, they are consistent with the idea that crowdfunding improves the identification
of valuable entrepreneurial projects. This promotes social welfare.
Our analysis further shows that the susceptibility of crowdfunding to entrepreneurial
moral hazard can prevent the implementation of fully efficient outcomes. Private cost
information may substantially exacerbate these inefficiencies. In particular, crowdfund-
ing attains fully efficient outcomes only if they are affluent, meaning that the project’s
ex ante expected return exceeds the agency costs associated with moral hazard and pri-
vate information. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment, resulting in
crowdfunding schemes with inefficiently high target levels.
As crowdfunding schemes by themselves are, in the presence of moral hazard and pri-
vate cost information, unable to attain efficiency in general, we see them as complements
rather than substitutes for traditional venture capital. We therefore expect a convergence
of the two financing forms so that venture capitalists can provide their expertise in re-
ducing moral hazard, while crowdfunding platforms enable a better screening for project
value. Current policy measures such as the US JOBS Act and its implementation in SEC
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(2015) will make such mixed forms easier to develop and will enable them to take advan-
tage of their respective strengths. The website of the crowdfunding platform Rockethub
already explicitly mentions this possible effect of the JOBS Act.33
In order to focus on the trade-off between demand uncertainty and entrepreneurial
moral hazard – which we view as two fundamental first-order problems in crowdfunding –
our analysis necessarily abstracts from many other relevant aspects and makes a number
of simplifying assumptions. For instance, we do not address the role of crowdfunders in
promoting the product. We further model the entrepreneur’s investment technology as
a deterministic one, leading to a well-defined private good without any network effects
or any other form of externalities.34 We also restricted attention to a model in which
price discrimination is not an issue. As shown by Ellman and Hurkens (2015), price
discrimination may, even in the absence of moral hazard, lead to a constrained efficient
“second-best” outcome. We, however, expect a model with both moral hazard and price
discrimination to yield similar insights concerning the role of deferred payments and of
restricting the entrepreneur’s information. A proper analysis is more involved, because
with price discrimination, welfare and profit maximization no longer coincide.
Apart from pointing out that crowdfunding and external capital provision in the form
of venture capital are complements, we also do not provide a formal analysis of the
interaction between external financing and reward crowdfunding. We moreover leave aside
possible issues concerning the platform’s commitment to enforce the mechanism honestly.
Since the platform is a long-term player we conjecture that it can uphold its honesty by
reputational arguments of repeated games (see Strausz, 2005). A proper analysis would,
however, require an explicit modeling of the platforms’ objectives, but these objectives
seem somewhat ambiguous.35 Although we consider all these issues to be important, they
lie outside the scope of the current investigation, which is to shed light on the salient
features of popular crowdfunding platforms to prevent entrepreneurial moral hazard.
Finally, an appealing practical feature of these popular crowdfunding schemes is their
simplicity; consumers seem to accept and understand their rules. Thus, we can view our
model as providing a benchmark in which these simple crowdfunding contracts are fully
optimal, suggesting that crowdfunding platforms gain little from using more sophisticated
schemes in slightly more complex environments.
33See http://www.rockethub.com/education/faq#jobs-act-index, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016.
34Yet, our results readily extend to investments with a commonly known stochastic outcome, e.g.,
projects that are successful only with a commonly known probability.
35In particular, modeling crowdfunding platforms as profit-maximizing firms does not seem in line with
their self-stated missions. For example, in 2015 Kickstarter reincorporated as a Benefit Corporation,
which is a legal corporate entity that, in addition to profit, explicitly includes positive impact on society,
workers, the community, and the environment as its legally defined goals (see https://www.kickstarter.
com/charter, last retrieved Sep. 10, 2016).
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Appendix
This appendix collects the formal proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows directly from the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Note first that the efficient output schedule x∗ is determinis-
tic. Hence, if it is implementable, there exists some Γ that randomizes only over direct
mechanisms γl = (tl, xl) that exhibit xl = x
∗. Since consumers and the entrepreneur are
risk-neutral, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to deterministic transfers
as well. Hence, the efficient output schedule x∗ is implementable if there exists a feasible
deterministic mechanism Γ = (1, γ∗) that implements x∗. We show, by contradiction,
that such a direct mechanism γ∗ does not exist.
Moreover, because K is a singleton, the entrepreneur has no private information about
her cost structure and, hence, the E-truthful condition (18) is vacuous. We can therefore
disregard it and the direct mechanism γ∗ effectively only request reports from consumers.
To safe on notation, we therefore suppress the dependence of variables and mechanisms
on the publicly observable cost structure (I, c). Let 1n denote the vector (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn.
Since n∗ = I/(1− c) = n− 1/2, it follows V∗ = {1n} so that the efficient output schedule
x∗(v) exhibits x∗0(v) = x
∗
i (v) = 0 for v 6= 1
n, and x∗0(v) = x
∗
i (v) = 1 for v = 1
n.
Suppose to the contrary that a direct mechanism γ∗ that implements x∗ does exist.
Then there exists a transfer schedule t so that the mechanism Γ∗ = (1, γ∗) with γ∗ =
(x∗, t) is feasible, i.e., satisfies (21)–(29). Since x∗0(v) = 1 implies v = 1








n)} is a singleton and Vγ
∗
= {1n}. Consequently, πΓ(1n|T ) = 1 and





n), (26) rewrites after




n)π(1n) ≥ Iπ(1n). (47)
Since x0(1




n)π(1n) ≥ Iπ(1n). (48)
Note further that (22) for each v 6= 1n implies
∑
i∈N
tai (v) + t
p
i (v) ≥ 0.





(tai (v) + t
p
i (v))π(v) ≥ 0. (49)





(tai (v) + t
p
i (v))π(v) ≥ 2Iπ(1
n) = (2n− 1)π(1n). (50)
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We now show that (50) contradicts (28) and (29). First note that (28) implies after a
multiplication by πi(0) for each i
∑
v-i∈V-i
(tai (0, v-i) + t
p
i (0, v-i))π(0, v-i) ≤ 0.





(tai (0, v-i) + t
p






i (1, v-i) = πi(1
n−1), constraint (29) implies, after a multiplication
with πi(1), that for each i
∑
v-i∈V-i
(tai (1, v-i) + t
p
i (1, v-i))π(1, v-i) ≤ π(1
n).





(tai (1, v-i) + t
p
i (1, v-i))π(1, v-i) ≤ π(1
n)n. (52)





(tai (v) + t
p
i (v))π(v) ≤ π(1
n)n.
But since 2n− 1 > n, this contradicts (50). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider a weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L with
some x̌l that is not development-efficient. That is, Γ̌ satisfies (21)-(26), (28), and (30)
and there exists a combination (Ĩ , c̃, v̄) such that x̌l0(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 1 and x̌li(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 0 for
all i ∈ N . Lowering x̌l0(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) to zero raises the objective S
Γ by plρ(Ĩ , c̃)π(v̄)Ĩ. We show
that this change yields a weakly feasible Γ′, and as a result Γ̌ is not optimal. To show
that Γ′ is weakly feasible, we show that it satisfies (21)–(26), (28), and (30), given that Γ̌
satisfies these constraints. Note first that the change does not affect any of the constraints
(24), (25), and (28), while it affects (21) and (22) only for (l, Ĩ , c̃, v̄) by lowering the right-
hand side by Ĩ. Hence, these constraints remain satisfied. Note further that because
x̌li(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 0 for all i ∈ N , (23) is vacuous for (l, Ĩ , c̃, v̄) so that the change does not
affect it. Moreover, the change only affects (26) for (Ĩ , c̃, v̄) by raising the left-hand side
and, hence, it remains satisfied. Finally, the change also keeps (30) satisfied, because it
raises ΠΓ̌(I, c), i.e., the left-hand side, while it lowers P Γ̌(T |Ĩ , c̃), i.e., the right-hand side.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Fix a weakly feasible Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L with x̌1, . . . , x̌L development-
efficient. Define for each (l, I, c, v),
Kl(I, c, v) ≡
∑
i∈N
ťali(I, c, v)− Ix̌l0(I, c, v).
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Since Γ̌ is weakly feasible, (21) implies that Kl(I, c, v) ≥ 0 for all (l, I, c, v). For any
(l, I, c, v), let nl(I, c, v) ≡
∑
i∈N x̌li(I, c, v) represent the total number of consumers with
xi = 1. For any (l, I, c, v) with x̌l0(I, c, v) = 0, define t̂
a
li(I, c, v) ≡ 0 and t̂
p
li(I, c, v) ≡
ťali(I, c, v) + ť
p
li(I, c, v). Similarly, for x̌l0(I, c, v) = 1 define t̂
a
li(I, c, v) ≡ ť
a
li(I, c, v) −
x̌li(I, c, v)Kl(I, c, v)/nl(I, c, v) and t̂
p
li(I, c, v) ≡ ť
p
li(I, c, v)+x̌li(I, c, v)Kl(I, c, v)/nl(I, c, v).
Since Γ̌ is weakly feasible and x̌l is development-efficient, it holds nl(I, c, v) > 0 if and

















li(I, c, v) −
Kl(I, c, v) = I for any (l, I, c, v) with x̌l0(I, c, v) = 1. Hence, (t̂, x̌l) satisfies (21) in
equality. We show that, because Γ̌ is weakly feasible, Γ̂ = {(p̌l, t̂l, x̌l)} is weakly feasible.
To see this, note first that – because t̂ali(I, c, v) + t̂
p
li(I, c, v) = ť
a
li(I, c, v) + ť
p
li(I, c, v) for all
(l, I, c, v) – the change from Γ̌ to Γ̂ leaves all constraints (22)–(25) and (28) unaffected.
We therefore only have to check that Γ̂ remains to satisfy (26) and (30).
In order to show that Γ̂ satisfies (26), first note that, by construction of t̂l, for all
(l, I, c) we have
v ∈ V γ̂l(I|I, c) ⇔ ∃T ∈ T Γ̌(I, c) :v ∈ V γ̌l(T |I, c).
Hence, for all (l, I, c) we have
{(v, l)|v ∈ V γ̂l(I|I, c)} = {(v, l)|∃T ∈ T Γ̌(I, c) :v ∈ V γ̌l(T |I, c)}, (53)







v∈V γ̌l (T |I,c)
π(v).
Multiplying by pl, summing over l, and rearranging terms yields















P Γ̌(T |I, c). (54)
Note that, by definition of ΠΓo ,




v∈V γ̌l (T |I,c)
plπ(v)Π
γ̌l(I, c|I, c, v).




v∈V γ̌l (T |I,c)
plπ(v)Π
γ̌l(I, c|I, c, v) ≥ P Γ̌(T |I, c)αT, ∀T ∈ T Γ̌(I, c).






v∈V γ̌l (T |I,c)
plπ(v)Π
γ̌l(I, c|I, c, v) ≥
∑
T∈T Γ̌(I,c)
P Γ̌(T |I, c)αI.
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γ̂l(I, c|I, c, v) ≥ P Γ̂(I|I, c)αI.
Dividing both sides by P Γ̂(I|I, c) shows that Γ̂ satisfies (26), since T Γ̂(I, c) = {I}.
Moreover, since Γ̌ satisfies (30) and, for any T ∈ T Γ̌(I, c), we have T ≥ I and
T Γ̂(I, c) = {I}, it follows for all (I, c, I ′, c′) ∈ K×K that, by (54),
ΠΓ̂(I, c) = ΠΓ̌(I, c) ≥
∑
T∈T Γ̌(I′,c′)
P Γ̌(T |I ′, c′)αT ≥
∑
T∈T Γ̌(I′,c′)
P Γ̂(T |I ′, c′)αI ′ = P Γ̂(I ′|I ′, c′)αI ′,
which shows that Γ̂ satisfies (30).
We conclude that Γ̂ is weakly feasible. Because for all (l, I, c, v) we have x̂l0(I, c, v) =
x̌l0(I, c, v), x̂li(I, c, v) = x̌li(I, c, v), and t̂
a
li(I, c, v) + t̂
p
li(I, c, v) = ť
a
li(I, c, v) + ť
p
li(I, c, v), Γ̂
is payoff equivalent to Γ̌. Finally, because (21) holds in equality for Γ̂, (22) reduces to
(31). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: To see that any maximizer Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l}l∈L of S
Γ subject to the
constraints (23), (24), (25), (28), (31), (32), and (33), and (21) in equality, exhibits (34),
suppose to the contrary that it is violated for some (I, c, 0, v-i) ∈ K×V , i.e., for some l, we
have x̌li(I, c, 0, v-i) = 1. But then lowering it to 0 and lowering ť
p
li(I, c, 0, v-i) by c raises the
objective by p̌lρ(I, c)π(0, v-i)c so that Γ̌ is not optimal if the changed mechanism respects
all the constraints. To see that it does so, first note that the change does not affect
(21) and (23). The combined reduction in x̌i(I, c, 0, v-i) and ť
p
i (I, c, 0, v-i) also implies
that (31) and (32) remain satisfied, while also Π(γ(I ′, c′, v)|I, c) remains unaffected for
any (I, c, I ′, c′) ∈ K2. Hence, Πγ(I, c) remains unaffected and, therefore (33) remains
satisfied. The change further relaxes (24) and (28), since it raises the left-hand side.
Finally, the change also keeps (25) satisfied, because it does not affect its left-hand side,
while it lowers the right-hand side by p̌lρ(I, c)πi(v-i)(1− c). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: We first prove that if Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L is weakly feasible, then
we find t̂ such that the mechanism Γ̂ = {(p̌l, t̂l, x̌l)}l∈L exhibits U
γ̌l
i (0|I, c, 0) = 0 for any
(l, I, c) and is weakly feasible. If U γ̌li (0|I, c, 0) = 0 for all (l, i, I, c), the result is immediate
by taking Γ̂ = Γ̌. Hence, suppose U γ̌li (0|I, c, 0) > 0 for some (l, i, Ĩ , c̃). Fix (l, i, Ĩ , c̃)





with t̂pl (.) defined as follows. For all v-i ∈ V-i set t̂
p
li(Ĩ , c̃, 0, v-i) = ť
p
li(Ĩ , c̃, 0, v-i) + U and
t̂pli(Ĩ , c̃, 1, v-i) = ť
p




l , x̌l) exhibits
U γ̂li (0|Ĩ , c̃, 0) = 0.
U γ̂li (0|Ĩ , c̃, 0) =
∑
v-i∈V-i







li(Ĩ , c̃, 0, v-i)− t̂
p






li(Ĩ , c̃, 0, v-i)− ť
p
li(Ĩ , c̃, 0, v-i)− U ]
= U γ̌li (0|Ĩ , c̃, 0)− U = 0
Because γ̂l and γ̌l exhibit the same output schedule x̌l, they generate the same surplus
Sx̌l(I, c) for all (I, c). Hence, if we define the mechanism Γ̂ as identical to Γ̌ but with γ̌l
exchanged for γ̂l for any (l, i, I, c) such that U
γ̌l
i (0|I, c, 0) > 0, then S
Γ̂ = SΓ̌. We next show
that, because Γ̌ is weakly feasible, so is the constructed Γ̂, i.e., it satisfies (23), (24), (25),
(28), (31), (32), and (33), and (21) in equality. To see this, note first that the change from
Γ̌ to Γ̂ affects only the transfers tpi (.) so that (21) and (23) remain unaffected and, therefore,
satisfied for Γ̂. Because ťpi (I, c, 0, v-i) and ť
p
i (I, c, 1, v-i) are changed by the same amount,
the change lowers the left- and right-hand side of (24) and (25) also by the same amount




i (0|I, c, 0) = 0.
Moreover, the change from Γ̌ to Γ̂ only raises the transfers, i.e., t̂pi (I, c, v) ≥ ť
p
i (I, c, v), the
constraints (31), (32), and (33) are relaxed so that Γ̂ remains to satisfy them.
To see the second statement, consider a weakly feasible Γ̌ with x̌l satisfying (34),
we construct a weakly feasible Γ̂ that exhibits U γ̂li (1|I, c, 1) = 0 and yields the same
aggregate surplus SΓ̌. By the first two statements of the lemma, we can adapt Γ̌ to Γ̃ so
that U γ̃li (0|I, c, 0) = U
Γ̃
i (0|0) = 0 and Γ̃ satisfies (28), (21), (23), (24), (25), (31), (32),




l (.)) with t̂
p
l (I, c, v)
defined by t̂pli(I, c, 0, v-i) = t̃
p
li(I, c, 0, v-i) and t̂
p
li(I, c, 1, v-i) = t̃
p
li(I, c, 1, v-i) + U
γ̌l
i (1|I, c, 1)




l , x̃)}l∈L so that Γ̂ differs from
Γ̃ only concerning tpli(I, c, 1, v-i) so that, by construction, U
γ̂l
i (1|I, c, 1) = 0.
U γ̂li (1|I, c, 1) =
∑
v-i∈V-i






li(I, c, 1, v-i)− t̃
a
li(I, c, 1, v-i)− t̂
p






li(I, c, 1, v-i)− t̃
a
li(I, c, 1, v-i)− t̃
p
li(I, c, 1, v-i)− U
γ̌l
i (1|I, c, 1)]
= U γ̌li (1|I, c, 1)− U
γ̌l
i (1|I, c, 1) = 0.
Note that because Γ̂ and Γ̃ and Γ̌ exhibit identical output schedules x̌l, they generate the
same surplus SΓ̂ = SΓ̃ = SΓ̌. Hence, it remains to show that Γ̂ is weakly feasible. This
follows since Γ̃ satisfies (23), (24), (25), (28), (31), (32), and (33), and (21) in equality,
so does Γ̂. To see this, note first that the change from Γ̃ to Γ̂ only affects the transfers
tpli(I, c, 1, v-i) by (weakly) raising them. Hence, (21), (23), and (28) remain unaffected.
Moreover, since the change only raises transfers tpi (I, c, 1, v-i), it relaxes the constraints
(24), (31), (32), and (33). It remains to show that Γ̂ respects (25). In order to see this,
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note that because Γ̌ satisfies, by assumption of the lemma, (34) for each x̌l also Γ̂ satisfies
(34). Hence, U Γ̂i (0|1) = U
Γ̂
i (0|0) = 0 = U
Γ̂
i (1|1) so that Γ̂ satisfies (25) in equality. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: Following Lemma 5, we may assume without loss of generality that
an optimal weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ satisfies U γ̂li (0|I, c, 0) = U
γ̂l
i (1|I, c, 1) = 0 for all












[ťali(I, c, v) + ť
p













π(v)Ix̌l0(I, c, v) = S
x̌(I, c),
where, using U γ̌li (0|I, c, 0) = U
γ̌l





π(v)[ťali(I, c, v) + ť
p








li(I, c, vi, v-i) + ť
p










li(I, c, 0, v-i) + ť
p






li(I, c, 1, v-i) + ť
p












li(I, c, 0, v-i) + ť
p






li(I, c, 1, v-i) + ť
p








i (0|I, c, 0) +
∑
v-i∈V-i
πi(v-i)x̌li(I, c, 0, v-i)(1− c)]
+πi(1)[−U
γ̌l
i (1|I, c, 1) +
∑
v-i∈V-i









πi(v-i)x̌li(I, c, 0, v-i)(1− c) + πi(1)
∑
v-i∈V-i







π(v)x̌li(I, c, v)(1− c).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2: If the efficient output schedule x∗ is implementable, then the
optimal feasible mechanism Γ̆ must implement it, because, by definition, no other output
schedule yields a larger surplus. Moreover, the proof of Proposition 1 already noted
that, because x∗ is deterministic, it is implementable if and only if there exists a transfer
schedule t̆ such that the deterministic mechanism Γ̆ = (1, γ̆) = (1, t̆, x∗) is feasible.
Note that for deterministic mechanisms, constraint (43) simplifies to
Sx
∗
(I, c) ≥ πx
∗
(I ′, c′)αI ′, ∀(I, c, I ′, c′) ∈ K×K.
It is therefore immediate that affluency is a necessary condition for the implementability
of x∗ by a weakly feasible mechanism Γ̌ and, hence, also for the implementability by a
(fully) feasible mechanism Γ̆.
It remains to prove that affluency is also a sufficient condition for the implementability
of x∗. We will do so constructively and, under the assumption that x∗ is affluent, construct
an explicit crowdfunding mechanism that implements it.
Because x∗ is development-efficient, it holds n(v) =
∑
i∈N vi > 0 for any x
∗
0(I, c, v) = 1
so that defining ť = (ťa, ťp) as
(ťai (I, c, v), ť
p
i (I, c, v)) ≡
{
(viI/n(v), vi[1− I/n(v)]) if x
∗
0(I, c, v) = 1,
(0, 0) otherwise,
yields a well-defined ť. For T (I, c) = I/(1 − c), the output schedule x∗ and transfers ť
satisfy (10)–(13) and the deterministic mechanism Γ̌ = (1, γ̌) = (1, ť, x∗) is, therefore, a
crowdfunding mechanism.
As we next show, given that x∗ is affluent, the crowdfunding mechanism Γ̌ satisfies
constraints (36)–(43) so that it is weakly feasible and, moreover, (27) and (29) so that it
is also feasible.




i (I, c, v) = 0 = x
∗
0(I, c, v)I.













j vj = I = x
∗
0(I, c, v)I.
Note that (38) holds, because x∗ is development-feasible.
To see (39) and (40), note that, because x∗ is development-efficient,





i (I, c, 1)− ť
a
i (I, c, 1)− ť
p
i (I, c, 1)] = 0.








i (I, c, v)c. Moreover, because x
∗ is development-efficient
and x∗0(I, c, v) = 1 implies n(v) ≥ I/(1− c), for x
∗




i (I, c, v) =
∑




i (I, c, v).
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π(v)(ťpi (I, c, v)− cx
∗































(I, c) ≥ πx
∗
(I, c)αI.
Finally, (43) follows because x∗ is affluent and x∗ satisfies (42) by definition. Hence,
γ̌ is weakly feasible,
We next show that γ̌ also satisfies the constraints (27) and (29).
To see (27), note that, because x∗0(I
′, c′, v) = 0 implies Πγ̌(I ′, c′|I, c, v) = 0, (27) holds
if
ΠΓ̌(I, c) ≥ πx
∗
(I ′, c′)max{ΠΓ̌o (T |I, c, I
′, c′), αI ′}.
That is, it holds if
ΠΓ̌(I, c) ≥ πx
∗
(I ′, c′)ΠΓ̌o (I
′|I, c, I ′, c′) and ΠΓ̌(I, c) ≥ πx
∗
(I ′, c′)αI ′.
The latter follows, since, by Lemma 6, ΠΓ̌(I, c) = Sx
∗
(I, c) and x∗ is affluent. To see also
the former inequality, note, because x∗0(I
′, c′, v) = 0 implies Πγ̌(I ′, c′|I, c, v) = 0, we have
πx
∗
(I ′, c′)ΠΓ̌o (I









π(v)Πγ̌(I ′, c′|I, c, v) =
∑
v∈V
π(v)Πγ̌(I ′, c′|I, c, v) =
∑
v∈V










′, c′, v) + ťpi (I














π(v) {x∗0(I, c, v)[n(v)(1− c)− I]} = S
γ̌(I, c) = Πγ̌(I, c) = ΠΓ̌(I, c),
where the inequality follows because x∗ is efficient.
Finally, to see (29), note
U Γ̌i (I, c|1) = U
γ̌










i (I, c, 1, v-i)− ť
a
i (I, c, 1, v-i)− ť
p






i (I, c, 1, v-i)[1− 1] = 0.
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We conclude that the crowdfunding mechanism Γ̌ is feasible and, therefore, implements
x∗ and yields surplus and ex ante profits of Sx
∗
. As a feasible mechanism cannot yield
more than Sx
∗
, it must be optimal and maximize ex ante profits. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7: The proof consists of 3 steps. We first prove that, for an optimal
Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L satisfying (36)–(43), for all (l, I, c, v) ∈ L×K×V , it holds
x̌l0(I, c, v) = 1 ⇒ x̌li(I, c, v) = vi. (55)
Second, we prove that if Γ̌ is optimal, then for each (l, I, c) ∈ L×K there exists a T ∈ N
such that (10) holds. In a final step, we prove that T is independent of l so that for each
(I, c) ∈ K there exists a T ∈ N such that (10) holds for any l ∈ L.
Step 1: Consider a Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L that satisfies (36)–(43), but for which con-
dition (55) is not satisfied. Hence, it holds that for some (l, I, c, v) ∈ L×K ×V that
x̌l0(I, c, v) = 1 but x̌li(I, c, v) 6= vi ∈ {0, 1}. Constraint (42) then implies vi = 1 so that
x̌li(I, c, v) = 0. It then follows that by raising x̌li(I, c, v) to 1, the objective S
Γ̌ is increased
by p̌lρ(I, c)π(v)(1 − c). By accompanying the raise in x̌li(I, c, v) by a raise in ť
p
li(I, c, v)
of 1 a changed mechanism obtains that remains to respect all constraints (36)–(43). It is
therefore also weakly feasible, and hence Γ̌ is not optimal.
Step 2: Next we show that if Γ̌ is optimal then i) x̌l0(I, c, v̂) = 1 implies xl0(I, c, v̄) = 1
for any v̄ such that n(v̄) > n(v̂), and ii) x̌l0(I, c, v̂) = 0 implies xl0(I, c, v̄) = 0 for any
n(v̄) < n(v̂). From this it then directly follows that, for any (l, I, c) ∈ L×K, there is a
T ∈ N such that, for all v ∈ V , it holds x0l(I, c, v) = 1 if n(v) > T and x0l(I, c, v) = 0 if
n(v) < T .
To see i) and ii), assume to the contrary that one of the two conditions does not
hold, meaning there exists an (l̄, Ĩ , c̃) ∈ L×K and v̄, v̂ ∈ V with n(v̄) < n(v̂) such that
x̌l̄0(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 1 and x̌l̄0(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = 0. Since n(v̄) < n(v̂) there exists a bijection j : N → N
such that v̄i = 1 implies v̂j(i) = 1. To show that Γ̌ is not optimal, we distinguish three
cases: 1. π(v̄) = π(v̂); 2. π(v̄) < π(v̂), and 3. π(v̄) > π(v̂).
Case 1: Adapt the mechanism Γ̌ to the mechanism Γ̂ by only replacing γ̌l̄ by the
mechanism γ̂ = (t̂, x̂), which is identical to γ̌l̄ for all (I, c, v) ∈ K×V except for (Ĩ , c̃, v̄)
and (Ĩ , c̃, v̂). Hence, for all (I, c, v) ∈ (K×V)\{(Ĩ , c̃, v̄), (Ĩ , c̃, v̂)}, it holds t̂(I, c, v) =
ťl̄(I, c, v) ∈ R
2n and x̂(I, c, v) = x̌l̄(I, c, v) ∈ {0, 1}
n+1. For all i ∈ N , let x̂0(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) =
x̂i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 0, t̂
a
i (Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = ť
a
l̄i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) − x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)Ĩ/n(v̄), and t̂
p
i (Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = ť
p
l̄i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) −
x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)[1 − Ĩ/n(v̄)]. Moreover, for all i ∈ N , let x̂0(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = 1 and x̂j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) =
x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄), t̂
a
j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = ť
a
l̄j(i)
(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)+ x̂j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)Ĩ/n(v̄), and t̂
p
j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = ť
p
l̄j(i)
(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)+
x̂j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)[1− Ĩ/n(v̄)]. Because π(v̄) = π(v̂), it holds π
x̌l̄(Ĩ , c̃) = πx̂(Ĩ , c̃) and, therefore,
πΓ̌(Ĩ , c̃) = πΓ̂(Ĩ , c̃).
Case 2: Consider the mechanism Γ̂ = {(p̂l, γ̌l)}l∈{0,...,L}, which, in addition to the
same collection of deterministic mechanisms γ̌l as Γ̌ but with γ̌l̄ exchanged by the deter-
ministic mechanism γ̂ as defined in Case 1, also contains the deterministic mechanism
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γ̌0 = (ť0, x̌0). This deterministic mechanism is identical to γ̌l̄ for all (I, c, v) ∈ K×V ex-
cept for (Ĩ , c̃, v̄). Hence, for all (I, c, v) ∈ K×V\{(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)}, let ť0(I, c, v) = ťl̄(I, c, v) ∈ R
2n
and x̌0(I, c, v) = x̌l̄(I, c, v) ∈ {0, 1}
n+1. For all i ∈ N , let x̌00(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = x̌0i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 0,
ťa0i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = ť
a
l̄i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) − x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)Ĩ/n(v̄), and ť
p
0i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = ť
p
l̄i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) − x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)[1 −
Ĩ/n(v̄)]. For Γ̂ we further set p̂l = p̌l for all l ∈ L\{l̄}, p̂l̄ = p̌l̄π(v̄)/π(v̂) < p̌l̄ and p̂0 =
p̌l̄[π(v̂)−π(v̄)]/π(v̂) ∈ (0, 1). Hence,
∑L
l=0 p̂l = 1. Note that π
Γ̌(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈L p̌lπ
x̌l(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈{0,...,L} p̂lπ
x̂l(Ĩ , c̃) = πΓ̂(Ĩ , c̃).
Case 3: Consider the mechanism Γ̂ = {(p̂l, γ̌l)}l∈{0,...,L}, which, in addition to the
same collection of deterministic mechanisms γ̌l as Γ̌ but with γ̌l̄ exchanged by the de-
terministic mechanism γ̂ as defined in Case 1, also contains the deterministic mecha-
nism γ̌0 = (ť0, x̌0). This deterministic mechanism is identical to γ̌l̄ for all (I, c, v) ∈
K×V except for (Ĩ , c̃, v̂). Hence, for all (I, c, v) ∈ (K×V)\{(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)}, let ť0(I, c, v) =
ťl̄(I, c, v) ∈ R
2n and x̌0(I, c, v) = x̌l̄(I, c, v) ∈ {0, 1}
n+1. For all i ∈ N , let x̌00(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = 1
and x̌0j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄), ť
a
0j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = ť
a
l̄j(i)
(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) + x̌0j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)Ĩ/n(v̄), and
ťp0j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = ť
p
l̄j(i)
(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) + x̌0j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)[1 − Ĩ/n(v̄)]. For Γ̂, we further set p̂l = p̌l
for all l ∈ L\{l̄}, p̂l̄ = p̌l̄π(v̂)/π(v̄) < p̌l̄ and p̂0 = p̌l̄[π(v̄) − π(v̂)]/π(v̄) ∈ (0, 1). Hence,
∑L
l=0 p̂l = 1. Note that π
Γ̌(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈L p̌lπ
x̌l(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑L
l=0 p̂lπ
x̂l(Ĩ , c̃) = πΓ̂(Ĩ , c̃).
In all 3 cases, we obtain an adapted mechanism Γ̂ that satisfies (36)–(43), but, be-
cause
∑
i∈N xi(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = n(v̄) < n(v̂), it does not satisfy (55). According to step 1, the
mechanism Γ̂ is not optimal. Since SΓ̌ = SΓ̂, this means that also Γ̌ is not optimal.
Step 3: Due to step 2, if Γ̌ is optimal, then, for any (l, I, c) ∈ L×K, there exists
an integer Tl(I, c) ∈ N such that if xl0(I, c, v1) 6= xl0(I, c, v2) and n(v1) = n(v2), then
n(v1) = n(v2) = Tl(I, c). Moreover, Tl(I, c) is a cutoff in the sense that xl0(I, c, v) = 0
for all v ∈ V such that n(v) < Tl(I, c), and xl0(I, c, v) = 1 for all v ∈ V such that
n(v) > Tl(I, c).
We next show that for an optimal Γ̌ there is a cutoff Tl(I, c) that is independent of l.
That is, we show that if xl̄0(Ĩ , c̃, v̄1) 6= xl̄0(Ĩ , c̃, v̄2), n(v̄1) = n(v̄2) = n(v̄), xl̂0(Ĩ , c̃, v̂1) 6=
xl̂0(Ĩ , c̃, v̂2) and n(v̂1) = n(v̂2) = n(v̂), then n(v̄) = n(v̂). By step 2 it then follows that
T (Ĩ , c̃) = n(v̄) = n(v̂) is such an l-independent cutoff.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that n(v̄) 6= n(v̂) and, without of loss of generality,
assume n(v̄) < n(v̂). This implies a bijection j : N → N such that v̄i = 1 implies
v̂j(i) = 1. By step 1, optimality of Γ̌ implies x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = vi, and x̌l̂0(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = 0 implies
x̌l̂i(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = 0.
Consider the (deterministic) direct mechanism γ̌l̄′ that is identical to γ̌l̄ except for
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) in that x̌l̄′0(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 0 and, for all i ∈ N , it holds x̌l̄′i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = 0, ť
a
l̄′i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) =
ťa
l̄i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)− x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)Ĩ/n(v̄), and ť
p
l̄′i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄) = ťp
l̄i
(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)− x̌l̄i(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)[1− Ĩ/n(v̄)].
Consider the (deterministic) direct mechanism γ̌l̂′ which is identical to γ̌l̂ except for




(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = ťa
l̂j(i)
(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)+x̌l̄′j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)Ĩ/n(v̄), and, similarly, ť
p
l̂′j(i)
(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = ťp
l̂j(i)
(Ĩ , c̃, v̂)+
x̌l̄′j(i)(Ĩ , c̃, v̄)[1− Ĩ/n(v̄)].
Once more, we distinguish three cases: 1. π(v̄) = π(v̂); 2. π(v̄) < π(v̂), and 3. π(v̄) >
π(v̂).
Case 1: We adapt the mechanism Γ̌ to Γ̂ by exchanging γ̌l̄ by γ̌l̄′ and γ̌l̂ by γ̌l̂′ . It then
follows that, because π(v̄) = π(v̂), we have πΓ̌(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈L π
x̌l(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈L π
x̂l(Ĩ , c̃) =
πΓ̂(Ĩ , c̃).
Case 2: We adapt the mechanism Γ̌ to Γ̂ by exchanging γ̌l̄ by γ̌l̄′ and γ̌l̂ by γ̌l̂′ . In
addition, we add to the collection Γ̂ the mechanism γ̌0 = (ť0, x̌0) as defined in Case 2
above. For Γ̂ we further set p̂l = p̌l for all l ∈ L\{l̂}, p̂l̂ = p̌l̂π(v̄)/π(v̂) < p̌l̂ and p̂0 =
p̌l̂[π(v̂)−π(v̄)]/π(v̂) ∈ (0, 1). Hence,
∑L
l=0 p̂l = 1. Note that π
Γ̌(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈L p̌lπ
x̌l(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈{0,...,L} p̂lπ
x̂l(Ĩ , c̃) = πΓ̂(Ĩ , c̃).
Case 3: We adapt the mechanism Γ̌ to Γ̂ by exchanging γ̌l̄ by γ̌l̄′ and γ̌l̂ by γ̌l̂′ . In
addition, we add to the collection Γ̂ the mechanism γ̌0 = (ť0, x̌0) as defined in Case 2
above. For Γ̂ we further set p̂l = p̌l for all l ∈ L\{l̂}, p̂l̂ = p̌l̂π(v̄)/π(v̂) < p̌l̂ and p̂0 =
p̌l̂[π(v̂)−π(v̄)]/π(v̂) ∈ (0, 1). Hence,
∑L
l=0 p̂l = 1. Note that π
Γ̌(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈L p̌lπ
x̌l(Ĩ , c̃) =
∑
l∈{0,...,L} p̂lπ
x̂l(Ĩ , c̃) = πΓ̂(Ĩ , c̃).
In all 3 cases, we obtain an adapted mechanism Γ̂ that satisfies (36)–(43), but, because
∑
i∈N xl̂i(Ĩ , c̃, v̂) = n(v̄) < n(v̂), it does not satisfy (55). According to Lemma 7, the
mechanism Γ̂ is not optimal. Since SΓ̌ = SΓ̂, also Γ̌ is not optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: By Lemmas 2–6, we can assume that the optimal weakly
feasible mechanism Γ̌ = {(p̌l, ťl, x̌l)}l∈L satisfies (36)–(43). By Lemma 7, we can moreover
assume that for an optimal weakly feasible mechanism, there is a function T : K → N
that satisfies (10). Lemma 7 implies that for any (l, i, I, c, v) ∈ L×N ×K×V such
that n(v) = T (I, c), we have (x̌0(I, c, v), x̌li(I, c, v)) = (0, 0) or (x̌0(I, c, v), x̌li(I, c, v)) =
(1, vi). Hence, the optimal weakly feasible mechanism specifies a unique output schedule
x(I, c, v) ∈ {0, 1}n+1 for any (I, c, v) such that n(v) 6= T (I, c), and it mixes between at
most two output schedules when n(v) = T (I, c).
With these observations, the proposition then follows by noting that we can complete
any collection {(p̂l, x̂l)}l∈L that satisfies the above conditions by a transfers schedule
{t̂l}l∈L as defined by (11)–(13). The resulting mechanism Γ̂ = {(p̂l, t̂l, x̂l)}l∈L then satisfies
(36)–(43) and the constraints (27) and (29). It is therefore not only weakly feasible but also
(strictly) feasible. We conclude that any constrained efficient allocation is implementable
by a crowdfunding mechanism and maximizes the entrepreneur’s ex ante profits. Q.E.D.
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